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Patent-Backed Securitization for Innovation
and Economic Growth in the Life Sciences: A
Proposal for Incremental Securities Law
Reform
Grace Sweeney*
I. THE BALANCE OF SECURITIES LAW BETWEEN
CONSERVATISM AND INNOVATION
(a) Introduction
One hundred years ago, with the advent of the telephone, the courts grappled
with the same perpetual challenge: the construction of a body of law capable of
yielding to advances in technology.
Sophisticated legal constructs, in the form of provincial Securities Acts and
their appointed Commissions, have since manifested in response to this challenge.
Operating on the premise of efficient market theory, the modern body of law has
chosen the vehicle of the prospectus1 — containing “full, true, and plain disclo-
sure”2 of material facts relating to issued securities — to direct capital to promising
enterprise. The surrounding securities legislation strives to regulate this capital flow
in a manner that is efficient, while also inducing confidence in the market by
preventing fraud.3
It is arguable that this legal system — enabling the investing of money based
upon real and traditional property — made possible much of the development of
industrial wealth in the 20th century.4 Historically, securities law has had empirical
effects of increased capital at reduced cost,5 increased flexibility in the exercise of
investment preference, reduced financial risk, and, ultimately, increased innovation.
Striking the correct balance between conservatism and innovation remains the
challenge facing securities law today. As the landscape has changed, the chosen
vehicle of the prospectus has been blamed for its effects. Speculation as to the va-
* The author is a JD Graduate studying biochemistry and patent law at the University of
Toronto. She previously completed a BA in public health and acted as a Visiting
Scholar at UCLA’s David Geffen School of Medicine.
1 Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S5, s 53(1).
2 Ibid. at s. 56(1).
3 Ibid. at s. 1.1.
4 Howard P Knopf, “Security Interests in Intellectual Property: An International Com-
parative Approach”, (2002) 7 International Intellectual Law & Policy 90-1, online:
Heinonline <http://heinonline.org> [Security Interests].
5 Christian Leuz, “Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regulation”, (4 February 2011),
online: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regula-
tion <http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/>.
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lidity of the theoretical premises of effective market theory, and the information
service provided by the prospectus, is not the intention of this article. What this
article seeks to accomplish, instead, is a topographical illustration of the larger
landscape within which the prospectus operates. While skepticism of the extent of
regulation may be warranted, another alternative is equally possible — the eco-
nomic landscape has changed, and the chosen vehicle of the prospectus must adapt
accordingly. The incremental reforms presented in this article, it is proposed, are
appropriate to accomplish such a purpose.
(i) The Vehicle of Securities Law: The Prospectus
The prospectus, requiring issuers’ continuous “full, true and plain disclosure
of all material facts”, acts as a medium between the securities issued and the
investors.6
Under National Instrument 41-101’s General Prospectus Requirements, the
book value of a company — its hard financial, built, and manufactured capital — is
captured in the form of the balance sheet, financial statements, and corporate and
capital structure.7 Under section 8.6(1)(c), additional disclosure requirements for
venture and IPO issuers mandate disclosure of intangible assets as material facts.8
The method of disclosure in the prospectus process is not similarly regulated, how-
ever, but left to the discretion of the issuer.
In the last century, this vehicle for disclosure, with its primary focus on tangi-
ble assets, served the twin goals of investor protection and efficient capital markets
well. A tangible asset like hot steel was a prime player, weighing in at 2000 pounds
and $370 USD for a unit price of 0.20 USD per pound. Today, a 0.00068 lb. dose
of Viagra costs $8 USD — a comparative unit price of $11,766.00 per pound.9
Milton Friedman’s analogy, “I, Pencil”, aptly captures the importance of in-
tangible assets. Although the wood pencil is common, few know how to acquire the
required inputs: the compressed graphite from South American mines, the wood
from Eastern Red Cedar, the iron ore for the obligatory saw. Knowledge of how to
make a pencil assumes primacy, relatively speaking, to mere possession of the tan-
gible assets required for its assembly. In the same way, the intangible asset class —
inclusive of intellectual property assets like patents, trade-marks, and copyrights —
are a primary source of value. It is the intangible assets underlying a company —
its established goodwill, patent monopolies, and brand value — which confer its
market value.
6 See Securities Act, supra note 1. See also Ontario Securities Commission, General
Prospectus Requirements, OSC NI 41-101 (8 August 2013) [NI 41-101].
7 Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg, Public Offerings in Canada (21 August 2009), on-
line at: Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg <http://www.dwpv.com>.
8 NI 41-101, supra note 6 at s. 8.6(1)(c). If the issuer is a venture issuer or an IPO
venture issuer that has not had significant revenue from operations in either of its last
two financial years, disclose a breakdown of material components of (c) intangible as-
sets arising from development; Companion Policy to National Instrument 41-101, Gen-
eral Prospectus Requirements.
9 Geoffrey Colvin, “We’re Worth our Weight in Pentium Chips, But We’re Producing A
Lot More,” Fortune (20 March 2000) online: CNN Money <http://money.cnn.com>.
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Economic commodities have become increasingly weightless; value is con-
centrated, not in steel tractors, but ethereal streams of data, images, and symbols10
with little or no physical manifestations.11 In 1982, while tangible assets comprised
62 percent of market value of the S&P 500,12 traditional financial instruments were
efficient and capable of investor protection. Today, between 50 and 84 percent of
that value is locked up in intangible assets (See Appendix A).13 It is trite to say that
the “efficient capital market” no longer gravitates, at least not primarily, on the axis
of tangible asset exchange.14 In this respect, the accounting methods and disclosure
contained in the prospectus may comprise only the tip of the iceberg of a com-
pany’s market value, and warrant consideration.
10 Charles Goldfinger, Intangible Economy and Financial Markets (2000) 40 Communi-
cations and Strategies 59, online: IDATE<http://www.idate.fr/fic/revue_telech/68/
goldfing.pdf> [“Intangible Economy”].
11 Danny T Quah, Increasingly Weightless Economies (1997) 31:1 Bank of England
Quarterly 49, online: Bank of England <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/
Documents/quarterlybulletin/qb970106.pdf>.
12 The Conference Board, Interim Report: Intangible Capital and the Valuation of Com-
panies — A Comparison of German and U.S. Corporations (Power Point Presentation),
online: <http://www.coinvest.org.uk/pub/CoInvest/COINVESTHulteninterim/HHJ_
INTERIM_report_June25_2009_to_JONATHAN.pdf>; Juergen H Daum, Intangible
Assets and Value Creation (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 2002) [Intangible Assets];
Ocean Tomo Intellectual Capital Equity, Intangible Asset Market Value, online:
<http://www.oceantomo.com/productsandservices/investments/intangible-market-
value>. In more conservative estimates, intangible assets comprise 54 percent of total
assets for American pharmaceutical firms. Using Juergan Daum’s, and intangible asset
merchant bank Ocean Tomo’s, methodology, intangible assets comprise approximately
80 percent of market value. In this methodology, intangible book value is calculated by
subtracting the tangible book value from the market capitalization of a given company
or index. In practice, companies report tangible book value per share, number of shares
outstanding, and market capitalization. Therefore, intangible book value can be calcu-
lated by subtracting the market capitalization from the tangible book value per share
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. It is expedient to do the calculation on
a per share basis, and simply subtract the tangible book value per share from the market
price. There are modest discrepancies between the two numbers due to differences in
setting shares outstanding on a company-by-company basis. However, the discrepancy
is rarely more than a few percentage points, which are within the error needed for most
purposes.
13 Michael A Gollin, Monetizing Intellectual Property to Improve Financial Performance
IP Buzz (November 2011), online: Venable LLP <http://www.venable.com> [Monetiz-
ing Intellectual Property]; Daum, Intangible Assets, supra note 12.
14 Goldfinger, “Intangible Economy”, supra note 10.
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(ii) Purposes of the Securities Act: Investor Protection and Market
Efficiency
The mandates of the Securities Act, investor protection15 and fair and efficient
capital markets, are accomplished through disclosure16 of all facts17 which can
“reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of
the securities”.18 is Limiting disclosure to tangible assets omits up to 84 percent of
corporate value. Investors, exercising reasonable reliance on the prospectus, are
vulnerable to un-quantified risk exposure, introducing volatility into the markets.
These are not the hallmarks of a “fair and efficient” capital market, but a precarious
one.19 To the extent that the prospectus operates, primarily in the paradigm of tan-
gible assets, the model falls prey to the law of diminishing returns in both of its
stated purposes.
(iii) Moving Forward — Models for Disclosure Relating to Intangible
Assets
The present set of questions will focus on whether an improved legal climate,
offering broader and more appropriate recognition for the intangible asset class,
would be useful to lenders, investors, and borrowers over the long term. While
implications may be drawn for all intangible assets, life science patents, due to their
robustness and extensive data, are examined here. The proposed reforms are rele-
vant to market value, generally. However, the financial instrument of asset-backed
securities, in which the patent is the asset underlying the security, provides a more
functional sphere of analysis. Incremental reform of disclosure requirements, ensur-
ing disclosure of all material facts relating to underlying assets, consistency, and a
“level playing field” among issuers, can fulfill the purposes of investor protection
and efficient capital markets.
(b) Overview
In this section, the historical balance struck by securities law between conser-
vatism and innovation was considered in the context of a shifting economic
landscape.
In Section II, the life sciences sector will be chosen to illustrate the current
barriers impeding capital flow to high-value enterprise, resulting in decreased inno-
vation and economic growth. These include the existence of “ever greening”, non-
practicing entities, patent thickets, and onerous transaction costs on upstream patent
holders with limited competency.
In Section III, the tool of intangible asset finance will be introduced as a
means of harnessing the value of intellectual property assets, and leveraging them
through securitization. This will be proposed as a method of constructing a bridge
15 Ibid.
16 Securities Act, supra note 1 at s. 53(1).
17 Securities Act, supra note 1 at s. 56(1).
18 Securities Act, supra note 1 at s. 1.1.
19 Securities Act, supra note 1 at s. 1.1.
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between early-stage research at the bench, and clinical applications at the bedside.
In Section IV, case studies of the instrument of patent-backed securities will be
presented with regard to the life sciences sector. Financial instruments, including
drug royalty securitization companies and mega funds, will be analyzed, and sev-
eral benefits outlined, along with more long-term impacts on the economy and pub-
lic health.
In Section V, quantitative, standardized, and empirically relevant indicia were
selected as measures of underlying asset value in patent-backed securities. Twenty-
two indicia will be identified for incremental reform of securities law, supplement-
ing existing areas of the prospectus — including Financial Information; Material
Facts; Risk Factors; Legal Proceedings and Regulatory Action; Material Contracts;
and Audit Committees and Corporate Governance — with modified disclosure
requirements.
Ultimately, evidence will be drawn in support of the thesis that incremental
reform, within the limited sphere of patent-backed securities, can ensure consis-
tency in achieving the Securities Act’s purposes of investor protection and market
efficiency. Through the use of financial engineering in intangible asset finance, the
decoupling of patents could have positive effects on innovation and growth in the
life sciences sector and high-value enterprise like it. The economic, social, and pub-
lic health benefits associated with this growth warrant meaningful consideration.
II. BARRIERS TO INNOVATION: THE PATH FROM BENCH TO
BEDSIDE
(a) Introduction
The Securities Act seeks to foster investor protection and efficiency through its
disclosure requirements. Capital markets depend upon the use of information in a
manner facilitating capital flow to high-value enterprise. This concept is known as
“informational efficiency”. Capital market imperfections in this respect — the clas-
sic “market for lemons”20 phenomenon — result in financing constraints.
The high-technology sector generates the new knowledge that is the condition
precedent of economic development, and is thus a prototype of “high-value enter-
prise”. It follows logically that the breakdown of disclosure requirements into in-
formational inefficiency, and the financing constraints which are a byproduct of
that, can barricade the existing flow of capital from reaching this high-value enter-
prise — thus hampering, to a proportionate extent, economic growth.
The biotechnology and pharmaceuticals sector is the second-largest high-tech-
nology industry in the 12 OECD countries.21 The effects of informational ineffi-
ciency are not exclusive to the economy: the treatment and cure of chronic, non-
20 GA Akerlof, “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism” (1970) 84 QJ Econ 488.
21 OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Economic Analysis and Sta-
tistics Division, ISIC REV. 3 TECHNOLOGY INTENSITY DEFINITION: Classifica-
tion of manufacturing industries into categories based on R&D intensities (7 July
2011) at 5, online: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/48350231.pdf>.
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communicable diseases like cancer are found in commercialized life sciences re-
search. This objective, important from a public health standpoint, necessitates
translation of basic research into clinical application - a vital, albeit capital-inten-
sive, condition precedent. This article illustrates those dynamics in the life sciences
sector.
(i) The Life Sciences Sector: A Paradox of Efficient Market Theory
The life sciences sector is, within the paradigm of efficient market theory, a
paradox. On one hand, it rivals the advent of the telephone: stem cell therapies are
curing debilitating forms of quadriplegia, and diseases that have confounded con-
ventional medicine are being unraveled by human genome sequencing.22 Society is
on the verge of revolutionary breakthroughs in treating disease, cancer in particular.
On the other hand, capital flow has slowed to a drought termed the “valley of
death”23 by industry professionals.
This capital shortage not only prevents investment, but innovation. While
seed-stage biomedical research may be occurring at the bench, it is not “translated”
into commercialized clinical applications at the bedside. “Translational research”
refers to the movement of promising “seed-stage” research into preclinical stud-
ies — including identifying biomarkers, target and pathway validation, and animal
model development — to generate “proof of concept” (POC).24 This process en-
ables that research to proceed through clinical trials, federal review and approval,
and, ultimately, approved clinical applications that can be commercialized for med-
ical use.
These occur in the form of new molecular entities (NMEs) and biologic li-
cense applications — both of which have sharply declined per dollar of investment.
While 2012 saw $48 billion spent on research, and $125 billion on clinical develop-
ment, only $6 billion was spent on translational efforts.25 The failure of transla-
tional research precludes medical discoveries from being translated into useful
products — and, it follows, the improvement of stock performance,26 economic
growth, and public health.
(b) Barriers to Innovation: The Path From Bench to Bedside
Seventy percent of Canada’s university research is conducted in the life sci-
ences, primarily with respect to cancer and heart disease. The preponderance of
22 JM Fernandez, RM Stein & AW Lo, “Commercializing Biomedical Research Through
Securitization Techniques” (2012) 30:10 Nat Biotechnol 964 at 964 [“Biomedical
Research”].
23 Ibid. at 965.
24 Milken Institute, Fixes in financing: Financial innovation for translational research
(April 2012), online: Milken Institute
<http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/FixesInFinancing.pdf> [Fixes in Financing].
25 Ibid. at 2.
26 SM Paul et al, “How to Improve R&D Productivity: The Pharmaceutical Industry’s
Grand Challenge” (2010) 9 Nat Rev Drug Discov 203 at 203 [“R&D Productivity”].
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investment occurs in the energy, clean technology, and IT industries.27 Canada,
operating as a net exporter of ideas, underperforms in its translation of research
into high-value products.28
Biomedical innovation is subject to particularly acute credit constraints: it is
riskier, more expensive, and more difficult to finance with traditional sources of
capital.29 Innovative firms cannot secure capital for a host of reasons: investment
returns are uncertain, they have little collateral to secure debt, and their capital —
mostly intangible — is both difficult to redeploy and characterized by relevant
bankruptcy costs.30 Commercializing one drug takes 14 years and $1.3 billion, and
for each success, there are 50 failures31 — rendering innovation unpalatable to
many investors’ risk preference. These odds are exacerbated by recent challenges:
declining prescription-drug spending and rising drug-development costs; shrinking
R&D budgets; the discovery of biomarkers limiting patient populations for certain
drugs;32 the 2012 patent cliff; regulatory uncertainty after the Vioxx (rofecoxib)
dispute and healthcare reform decision; lower risk tolerance among venture capital-
ists; unprecedented market volatility; and the heightened level of financial uncer-
tainty from ongoing repercussions of the financial crisis.33 While other industries
may share these challenges, it is difficult to identify another so heavily burdened by
all of them.
The main barriers to innovation, interrelated with these challenges, are presen-
ted here.
(i) Ever Greening and the Focus on Blockbusters
In granting a monopoly in exchange for public disclosure, the Patent Act34
seeks to promote inventiveness.35 The above pressures, however, led some firms to
recoup costs by extending that patent monopoly by way of secondary and tertiary
protection, producing a bottleneck effect.
This “ever greening”,36 which funnels two-thirds of R&D capital to the devel-
opment of duplicative drugs, rather than the qualitative breakthroughs presented by
27 Wallace Imen, “Stubborn Innovation Gap Persists in Canada” The Globe and Mail (25
May 2012), online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
28 Ibid.
29 JM Fernandez, RM Stein & AW Lo, “Biomedical Research”, supra note 22 at 964.
30 R Carpenter & B Petersen, “Capital market imperfections, high-tech investment and
new equity financing” (2002) 112:477 Econ J 54 at 54.; BH Hall, “The Financing of
Research and Development” (2002) 18:1 Oxf Rev Econ Pol 35 at 40.
31 “Should Patents on Pharmaceuticals Be Extended to Facilitate Innovation?” The Wall
Street Journal (23 January 2012), online: The Wall Street Journal
<http://online.wsj.com>.
32 2010 Annual Global Corporate Default Study and Rating Transitions (30 March 2011),
online: Standard & Poor’s <http://www.standardandpoors.com>.
33 JM Fernandez, RM Stein & AW Lo, “Biomedical Research”, supra note 22 at 964.
34 Patent Act, RSC 1985, c P-4.
35 Apotex Inc. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc., 2008 S.C.C. 61.
36 Ibid.
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innovative drugs,37 has been criticized by the Supreme Court of Canada. Despite a
near doubling of aggregate R&D (from $68 billion in 2002, to $127 billion in
2010), the number of new drugs has not changed appreciably.38 Without change, it
is suggested that market forces will likely result in a dearth of innovative products
in the biomedical sector. Polarization of the pipeline towards late-stage drug devel-
opment is unsustainable. Ultimately, firms will possess insufficient innovation to
replace revenue loss from successful products’ patent expirations.39 Ironically,
these efforts will compound the effects they seek to circumvent.
(ii) Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs) or “Patent Trolls”
While biomedical R&D may result in a patent, the path from bench to bedside
is an uphill battle. In the last two decades, the number of patent lawsuits filed in
U.S. district courts had tripled to 3,260;40 in 2012, they constituted 58 percent of all
lawsuits filed.41 This is largely the result of offensive suits launched against patent-
holders by non-practicing entities (NPEs), or “patent trolls,” with an average $2
million cost for patent-holders,42 on whom the burden of proof is imposed.
While large companies can file thousands of pre-emptive patent applications
in emerging industries, startups are easy prey once their products show promise.43
Having spent $3 million to succeed in one such patent trial, the threat of five more
forced the iPhone’s Siri voice recognition software developer to sell his technology
to a patent troll — whose stock price subsequently jumped by 70 percent.44 The
MIT researcher, largely known as one of the most innovative thinkers in computer
speech, has now left the industry altogether.45 In this respect, the consequences of
NPEs are the suffocation of innovation and economic growth.46 In 2011, NPEs cost
the US economy $29 billion — as a tax on innovation, that’s more than 10 percent
of the $247 billion spent on R&D in 2009.47 That qualified as “decimation” —
37 Dean Baker, Financing Drug Research: What are the Issues? (22 September 2004),
online: Center for Economic and Policy Research <http://www.cepr.net>.
38 Evaluate Pharma, World Preview 2016 (May 2010), online: Evaluate Pharma
<http://www.atebion-bds.com/pdfs/evaluatepharma_world_preview.pdf>.
39 Paul et al, “R&D Productivity”, supra note 26 at 203.
40 Ibid.
41 S Jeruss et al, “The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities
on US Litigation” (2012) 11 Duke L & Tech Rev 357.
42 Mark Gibbs, “A Patent Troll Wants to Charge You for E-mailing Your Scans” Forbes
(5 January 2013), online: Forbes <http://www.forbes.com>.
43 Ibid.
44 Charles Duhig & Steve Lorr, “The Patent, Used as a Sword” New York Times (7 Octo-
ber 2012), online: New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com>.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 JE Bessen & MJ Meurer, “The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes” (2012) 99 Cornell L
Rev (forthcoming), online: Social Science Research Network
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2091210>.
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reduction by a tenth,48 leading to executive action following the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act.
Until reform of this system occurs, another strategy will be necessary to
stymie NPEs and enable downstream development of biomedical innovation by en-
tities capable of successfully protecting, enforcing, and commercialize rights.
(iii) Patent Thickets: The “Anti-commons” of Biomedical Research
A third barrier to biomedical innovation occurs in the form of patent thickets,
a dense web of overlapping IP rights which impedes translation of early-stage as-
sets into commercialized products.49 When the cost of entry for patenting is raised
such to the extent that it has a negative impact on social welfare, an “anti-com-
mons” is established, where scarce resources are under-used because too many
owners can block each other.50 Deleterious effects include increased litigation and
pendency of patents and growing uncertainty about validity of pending and granted
patents,51 all of which exacerbate the hold-up of innovative biomedical products,
which is detrimental to public health. Patent thickets impose significant barriers to
innovation, economic growth, and public health, and have thus been a concern to
antitrust agencies, and European5252 and U.S. regulators for over a decade.53
48 Steven Levy, “The Patent Problem” Wired (13 November 2012), online: Wired
<http://www.wired.com>.
49 C Shapiro, “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard
Setting”, in AB Jaffe et al, Innovation Policy and the Economy, (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2000) at 119.
50 MA Heller, & RS Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-commons in
Biomedical Research” (1998) 280 Science 698 [“Deter Innovation”].
51 Ibid.
52 A Arundel & P Patel, “Strategic Patenting: Background Report”, (2003) online:
<http://proinno.intrasoft.be/reports/documents/TCW15_background_paper.pdf>; D
Harhoff, “Patent Quantity and Quality in Europe — Trends and Policy Implications”,
in B Kahin & F Foray, eds, Advancing Knowledge and the Knowledge Economy (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press) at 331; D Harhoff et al, “The Strategic Use of Patents and its
Implications for Enterprise and Competition Policies. Final Report for EC
ENTR/05/82” (8 July 2007), online: European Commission, <http://www.en.inno-
tec.bwl.uni-muenchen.de/research/proj/laufendeprojekte/patents/stratpat2007.pdf>.
53 Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation — The Proper Balance of Compe-
tition and Patent Law and Policy (October 2003), online: Federal Trade Commission
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf>; Federal Trade Commission, Anti-
trust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Compe-
tition (April 2007), online: Federal Trade Commission <http://www.ftc.gov>; The
Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies With Competition
(March 2011), online: Federal Trade Commission
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf>.
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(iv) Prohibitive Transaction Costs and Limited Competence of Upstream
Patent Holders
While public institutions are the most common source of innovative biomedi-
cal research, they struggle inordinately to maintain an adequate foothold to actively
patent these discoveries.54 The decision to commercialize arises early in R&D,
when outcomes are uncertain; potential gains, speculative; and the value of down-
stream products indeterminately justified relative to the costs of the anti-
commons.55
Universities, which produce approximately two-thirds of seed research, are
often ill-equipped to handle multiple transactions for acquiring licenses to use re-
search tools; negotiation delays stifle research, while reliance on obsolete public
domain technologies fails to garner favor in grant competitions.56 With limited re-
sources and competence, the fast-paced, market-oriented bargaining,57 and high
transaction costs associated with bundling IP rights are often prohibitive of the
firm’s decision to continue with the remainder of the battle: commercialization.
In contrast to public institutions and small start-up firms, corporations with
substantial legal departments may have more substantive resources to bring a prod-
uct to market.58 Being more skilled in patent enforcement, patent acquisitions by
these corporations can reduce litigation while moving capital to innovators, which
enhances incentives to innovate.
(c) Implications for Public Health and Economic Growth
In 2009, cancer accounted for almost a quarter of mortality in the U.S, and
was the second leading cause of death. A male’s lifetime risk of developing cancer
is one in two; a female’s, one in three.59 The failure to translate basic biomedical
research in the life sciences results in a deficit of innovative healthcare, which is
compounded by the subsequent economic cost of the potential life years lost
(PLYL). Data from an isolated cohort of cancer patients quantified this cost at ap-
proximately 890,000 PLYL, or $89 billion annually — a net present value of $2.2
trillion.60 A permanent 1 percent reduction in cancer mortality has a present value
of nearly $500 billion; a cure, approximately $50 trillion.61
Paradoxically, despite 70 percent of Canadian R&D being invested in the life
sciences, virtually none of those discoveries are being translated into commercial-
ized drugs presenting qualitative breakthroughs, but rather, to the development of





59 American Cancer Society, “Lifetime Risk of Developing or Dying from Cancer”, (29
November 2012) online: American Cancer Society <http://www.cancer.org>.
60 Eric Budish et al, Do Fixed Patent Terms Distort Innovation? Evidence from Cancer
Clinical Trials (22 August 2013), online: MIT <http://economics.mit.edu/files/8651>.
61 Kevin Murphy & Robert Topel, “The Value of Health and Longevity” (2006) 114 J
Polit Econ 871.
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duplicative drugs. This is not where reductions of cancer mortality, or any other
significant healthcare gains, are to be found. If stagnancy in healthcare is to be
overcome, the privatization of biomedical research must be more carefully
deployed — in a manner conducive to both upstream innovation, and downstream
product development and commercialization.62 It is clear that the life sciences sec-
tor needs novel approaches to early-stage drug development that improve value cre-
ation, better manage risk, create access to new capital sources, and lower the cost of
that capital. Instead of backing early-stage companies to create the next generation
of start-ups, what is needed is the financing of a diverse field of promising prod-
ucts. What is needed are models that break down the R&D value chain to offer an
acceptable return on investment (ROI) through each stage of development, effec-
tively spreading the investment risk and reward throughout the entire R&D
process.63
III. A CATALYST FOR INNOVATION: INTANGIBLE ASSET
FINANCE
As Section II illustrates, the amount of innovative biomedical research ex-
ceeds available capital flow for translation into commercialized products.64 This
deficit mandates a more comprehensive solution than public funding. Linking a
public health objective, like cancer, to a profit motive may seem heretical. Finan-
cial incentives, however, can mobilize a broader set of stakeholders and a more
expansive pool of assets,65 initiating a virtuous cycle of investor confidence that
magnifies the likelihood of success.66 The role of finance in accomplishing this
brand of innovation will be considered here.
The paradox of high-value enterprise in the life sciences with insufficient capi-
tal flow defies efficient market theory. Rather than jettisoning the prospectus, this
section will illustrate a more measured response, adapting the scrutiny of existing
intangible asset disclosure in the prospectus to ensure consistency in informational
efficiency, regardless of the economic landscape.67 Because the majority of value
in the life sciences resides in off-balance-sheet patents disembodied from conven-
tional accounting standards, informational inefficiency exists. It is proposed that
this inconsistency, rather than the vehicle of the prospectus itself, is the defining
element in precluding adequate disclosure, investor protection, and market effi-
ciency. By the end of this section, financial instruments with the capacity of en-
compassing and governing this “shadow economy” are presented as a means of
ensuring consistency in those objectives.
62 MA & Heller, RS Eisenberg, “Deter Innovation”, supra note 50.
63 Milken Institute, Fixes in financing, supra note 24.
64 Fernandez, Stein & Lo, “Biomedical Research”, supra note 22 at 964.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 NI 41-101, supra note 6 at s. 8.6(1)(c). If the issuer is a venture issuer or an IPO
venture issuer that has not had significant revenue from operations in either of its last
two financial years, disclose a breakdown of material components of (c) intangible as-
sets arising from development; Companion Policy to National Instrument 41-101, Gen-
eral Prospectus Requirements.
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(a) Shortcomings of Traditional Financial Instruments in the “New”
Economy
(i) The Failure of Intangible Assets to be Appropriately Valued in Finance
It is in intangible asset finance that the prospectus, with its disclosure of earn-
ings, cash flows, and book values,68 and comparably less scrutinized disclosure of
intangibles, most seriously fails to reflect enterprise value. This is due to a distor-
tion in the accounting process of periodically matching costs with revenues.69
While intangible assets, like patents, are immediately expensed, their benefits are
recorded at a later time, divorced from those original investments.70 In this manner,
the rigor and uniformity of securities law governing tangible assets fails to encom-
pass intangibles, compromising information symmetry.71 Here, potential financial
models for reinstating consistency and confidence in the capital markets will be
explored.
(ii) Going Forward: Instruments for Intangible Asset Valuation
The shifting economic landscape demands a determination of the best method
of understanding, and communicating, the divergence of an issuer’s market valua-
tion from its book value.72 Three models exist in the literature. The first, and de-
fault, model attributes divergence to a vague, ill defined “intangible asset class”,
and ceases with the exercise. As discussed, this threatens investor protection and
market volatility.73 A more liberal model supplants traditional financial instruments
entirely with a new reporting paradigm.74 In a third model, accounting standards
quantify those assets that are generated internally.75
This article proposes a fourth, alternative model commensurate with the shift-
ing economic landscape outlined in Section II. While more tempered than the “new
economy” liberalization discourse, it is also more successful in maintaining the del-
icate balance of conservatism and innovation struck by securities law. With over
500 years of practice in understanding financial statements for over 560 trillion in
total assets, interference would render assets more uncertain, and consequently less
valuable. Overbroad reform of financial reporting would thus be injurious to inves-
tor protection and market efficiency. Incremental reform of the existing body of
securities law, however, can adapt to these intangible assets. This will ensure that
68 Baruch Lev & Paul Zarowin, “The Boundaries of Financial Reporting and How to Ex-
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the rigor and uniformity of disclosure of material facts relating to a security’s un-
derlying asset class is consistently applied within the capital markets. In the follow-
ing section, two financial instruments, which accomplish this with respect to pat-
ents, are presented.
(b) Intangible Asset Finance: Patent-Backed Securities as Bridging
Mechanisms for Translational Research in the Life Sciences Sector
(i) Introduction to Intangible Asset Finance: Prevalence of IP-Backed
Securities
IP-backed securities are a slowly developing asset class, growing from $380
million in transactions in 1997 to $1.13 billion in 2000 (See Appendix B).76 The
class commenced with the $55 million securitization of royalties on copyrights of
David Bowie — “Bowie Bonds” — and extended to deals with Rod Stewart, Tom
Clancy, and Toni Morrison.77 This extended to film companies like Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox, DreamWorks SKG, and $650 million sale of bonds backed by cash flows
from films slated for production by Polygram, Inc. over a three-year period78 In
sports, Ascent Entertainment, owner of Denver’s NBA and NHL franchises, raised
funds for its Pepsi Center Arena by issuing $130 million in asset-backed securi-
ties.79 These novel forms of financial engineering are only just beginning to be
applied to patents.
(ii) Patents as Key Players in Intangible Asset Finance
The most tangible forms of IP, patents enjoy the most robust legal protection,
and have the greatest effect on the commercial success and market value of compa-
nies.80 Patent databases also operate as powerful sources of data.
Patent value stems from a legally conferred monopoly on the manufacture,
distribution, and sale of a patent.81 This value extends to the licensing or assign-
76 David Edwards, Patent Backed Securitization: Blueprint for a New Asset Class (2001),
online: Gerling NCM <http://www.securitization.net/pdf/gerling_new_0302.pdf>
[Blueprint].
77 Jennifer Sylva, “Bowie Bonds Sold for Far More Than a Song: The Securitization of
Intellectual Property as a Super-Charged Vehicle for High Technology Financing”
(1999) 15 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech LJ 195.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 “An Economic Analysis of Royalty Terms in Patent Licenses” (1983) 67 Minn L Rev
1198 [“Royalty Terms”].
81 C Odasso & E Ughetto, “Patent-backed Securities in Pharmaceuticals: What Deter-
mines Success or Failure? (2011) 41:3 R&D Management 219”, online: European Pol-
icy for Intellectual Property
<http://www.epip.eu/conferences/epip04/files/UGHETTO_Elisa.pdf> [Patent-backed
Securities]; JA Agiato, “The Basics of Financing Intellectual Property Royalties”
(2002) in B Berman ed, From Ideas to Assets: Investing Wisely in Intellectual Property
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2002).
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ment of some or all of the IP in exchange for periodic royalty payments.82 These
characteristics render patents, if collateralized by the royalty streams that they gen-
erate, revenue-generating assets capable of exploitation. Data indicates that there is
sufficient capital available for the continued emergence of this asset class — be-
tween 1990 and 1998, patent-licensing revenues increased by almost 700 percent to
$100 billion, exhibiting a compounded annual growth rate at approximately 28 per-
cent.83 The share of market valuation assumed by intangible assets has since con-
tinued to rise.
(iii) Patent-Backed Securities: A New Intangible Asset Class
The method for the exploitation of patents occurs through their securitiza-
tion — the conversion of those assets, or their accompanying cash flow, into mar-
ketable securities. The assets are transferred into a separate legal entity, usually a
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or “portfolio.”84 Both terms will be used inter-
changeably here. Securities, contingent upon the payments received by those assets,
are issued to the new asset holder.85 In this respect, the IP is delinked from market
value such that it alone forms the underlying asset of the security. The credit and
performance attributes of the asset-backed securities are dependent on underlying
assets, rather than concerns relating to ancillary business activities and attendant
risks.
In this way, its value can be extracted from the vague, undifferentiated 50-84
percent of a firm’s market valuation. Through the use of patent-backed securitiza-
tion, the share of market value that lays locked in intangible assets can be “un-
locked,” and capital more efficiently redirected to promising enterprise. The result
is that a firm is enabled to then borrow money against the value of its intangible
assets, and the stream of cash flows that was otherwise to accrue to it as a result of
those assets.86 This permits the asset holder to acquire greater amounts of cash87
for less expense than commercial bank loans.88
(iv) Overcoming the Capital Flow Barriers of Traditional Finance
Despite the great need for increased capital and translational research in the
life sciences sector, the trend of intangible asset securitization is only beginning to
develop in the life sciences sector. While this can be attributed in part to the afore-
mentioned risks posed in the industry, it is argued here that this primarily results
82 Law Commission of Canada, Leveraging Knowledge Assets: Reducing Uncertainty for
Security Interests in Intellectual Property 2004, online: Dalhousie Library
<http://dalspace.library.dal.ca/handle/10222/10279>.
83 Blueprint, supra note 76.
84 Malcolm S Dorris & Edward J O’Connell, “Problem Cases in Bankruptcy” (1995) 50
Bus Law 527 [“Problem Cases”].
85 Edwards, Blueprint, supra note 76.
86 “Royalty Terms”, supra note 80 at 1230.
87 Sam Adler, “David Bowie’s $55 Million Haul: Using a Musician’s Assets to Structure
a Bond Offering” (1997) Ent L & Fin 5.
88 Dorris & O’Connell, “Problem Cases”, supra note 84.
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from the informational inefficiency engendered by the shortcomings of securities
law, and disclosure requirements, in the context of intangible asset finance. In this
section, the myriad ways in which securitization instruments can serve to outweigh
the risks plaguing the industry, to a degree sufficient to present a favorable risk-
reward profile for investors and attract capital to the sector, will be presented. This
will be followed by a discussion of disclosure requirements, sufficient to improve
informational efficiency.
Large pharmaceutical companies obtain capital through public equity, by sell-
ing shares on the stock exchange. This option is unavailable to upstream patent
holders, like universities since at the earlier stages of drug development, they can-
not yet establish similarly favorable trajectories (of growing sales and profits) over
a period of several years.
To these upstream patent holders, debt finance from banks and other institu-
tions are a second option. Such institutions, however, have low risk tolerance.
Loans, made against personal guarantees and liquid assets, often require collateral
exceeding their value threefold. This risk appetite is diametrically opposed, in mul-
tiple respects, to the intangible and high-risk nature of investment in early-stage,
preclinical biotechnology.
The next viable sources of funding for actors with seed-stage biomedical re-
search is private equity: angel and venture capital (VC) investors, which still play a
limited role in many countries. This industry, however, exacerbates the difficulties
posed by the investor’s desire for strong risk-reward profiles to the emerging and
promising discoveries of the life sciences sector.
VCs center on risk and exit opportunities, generally providing capital to highly
profitable firms with above-average future growth prospects, a strong market share
and significant competitive advantages over rivals, and a superior management
team, with an aim to achieve above-average returns while minimizing investment
risks.89 They review about five hundred business plans to make five investments,
on average.90
In contrast, the most valuable assets — the seed-stage, pre-clinical research
forming the core of innovative clinical applications, which might be the next block-
buster drug — present an even less favorable risk-reward profile. Early-stage re-
search requires significant capital, and competes with dominant market players.
From 2001 to 2010, life sciences VC funds had an average internal rate of return
(IRR) of -1 percent;91 the compound annual rate of return (ARR) of pharmaceutical
stock market indexes is approximately 0 percent. A recent survey found that 40
percent of VC funds planned to decrease pharmaceutical investment, and 42 per-
cent to increase investment in non-FDA regulated health services.92
89 Ian Ellis, Maximizing Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets: Case Studies in In-
tangible Asset Finance (November 2009), online: Athena Alliance
<http://www.athenaalliance.org> [Intellectual Property].
90 Ibid.
91 Fernandez, Stein & Lo, “Biomedical Research”, supra note 22 at 964.
92 National Venture Capital Association & Medical Innovation-Competitiveness Coali-
tion, Vital Signs: The Crisis in Investment in U.S. Medical Innovation and the Impera-
298   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [11 C.J.L.T.]
When VC funding is in fact secured, additional backing is often required. A
second round of equity investment can be problematic: companies may not want to
dilute current equity, and the prospective of a “down round” — a lower or similar
valuation compared with the original position — is even more unattractive.93
Patent-backed securities are a unique alternative to traditional bank loans be-
cause they generate more capital, and may either have a fixed or floating interest
rate. Bonds are also preferable to a sale of IP because licensing revenue generally
increases over time due to an ever-expanding market. Additional benefits are out-
lined in the next section.
For the purposes of investor protection, and ensuring this capital flow is as fair
and efficient as possible, the following section will present two models for patent-
backed securitization, and discuss how securities law can evolve to ensure investor
protection, in the form of disclosure of facts material to the underlying asset.94
IV. A BRIDGE FROM BENCH TO BEDSIDE: PATENT-BACKED
SECURITIES
(a) Introduction
In section II, the high-value enterprise of the life sciences sector, and the barri-
ers to innovation it currently faces, were outlined. The need to look for new sources
of capital flow, which can facilitate the translation of basic biomedical research into
commercialized products, was addressed. In times of economic crisis when equity
rounds are difficult and IPOs impossible, an increased focus on capital efficiency,
the alternative proposal of “financial engineering”95 — raising capital by selling
royalty or revenue rights — may prove capable of bridging this fundamental para-
dox in the life sciences sector. If such a model were feasible, the barriers to innova-
tion posed by ever greening, non-practicing entities, and patent thickets might be
overcome, and corresponding public health and economic benefits realized. Two
models of patent-backed securities will be presented here as a means of bridging
this “valley of death” in the life sciences sector.
(b) Types of Patent-Backed Securities
(i) Royalty Securitization Companies
The first patent-backed security is an emerging class of business entities, drug-
royalty securitization companies, which adopt a securitization approach to financ-
ing life sciences companies. This includes companies like Royalty Pharma (New
York, NY, USA), Cowen Healthcare (Stamford, CT, USA) and DRI Capital (To-
ronto, ON, Canada).These investment vehicles acquire ownership interests in the
royalty streams of late-stage, approved drugs. To make risk-reward profiles more
attractive for investors in a risky sector, those interests are combined into a single
tive of FDA Reform (6 October 2011), online: National Venture Capital Association
<http://nvcaccess.nvca.org>.
93 Ellis, Intellectual Property, supra note 89.
94 Securities Act, supra note 1.
95 Fernandez, Stein & Lo, “Biomedical Research”, supra note 22 at 964.
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portfolio. In this manner, the royalty securitization company assumes the future
risks and rewards of ownership. The latter includes the ability to issue securities on
royalties divorced from the holder’s liabilities.
The patent holder, in exchange, is liberated from the full term of the patent
and royalty stream, and conferred increased liquidity. This allows the patent holder
to immediately recoup the initial investment, which facilitates accelerated turnover
and innovation within the sector.
Universities are the primary drivers of life sciences research, and also operate
as rich sources of seed-stage biomedical innovation. American universities now
collect more than USD $700 million per annum in patent royalties, executing over
3,300 licenses a year.96 In Canada, where 70 percent of R&D is spent on life sci-
ences research, the benefits are self-perpetuating. The establishment of royalty
securitization companies rewards Canadian innovation with upfront liquidity,
which can further biomedical research. One example is Royalty Pharma’s securi-
tization of Yale’s patents, 911, 200 and 942, 686, related to HIV drug Zerit, gener-
ating $115-million upfront for the construction of a new research facility.
While single-asset securitization, requiring a stable, predictable, cash flow, re-
mains risky in the context of the life sciences sector, portfolio approaches mitigate
this risk. DRI Capital is the first of a select group of diversified pools of pharma-
ceutical patent royalties, offering greater structural stability and risk diversification.
With sufficient programs in a portfolio, revenues are more easily valued, and make
more attractive from a risk-reward perspective. A second case study is Royalty
Pharma. During chemotherapy, about half of patients develop neutropenia, which
increases the risk of serious infection. This is treated primarily by Neupogen® (fil-
grastim) and Neulasta® (pegfilgrastim), or granulocyte colony stimulating factor
(G-CSF). Discovered by Memorial Sloan Kettering (MSK)97 in 1988, G-CSF is a
genetically engineered version of a naturally occurring protein, the body’s primary
defense against bacterial infection. Essentially, it stimulates white blood cell (neu-
trophil) production in bone marrow. This reduces infection frequency and severity
in chemotherapy, and makes treatment possible where it previously was not. In
1991, MSK licensed patent US 4961926 A98 to Amgen for marketing as Neu-
pogen®/Neulasta®. Since, it has become cancer’s standard of care,99 and a block-
buster with combined 2011 sales of $5.3 billion.100
96 Edwards, Blueprint, supra note 76.
97 JL Gabrilove et al, “Phase I Study of Granulocyte Colony-Stimulating Factor in Pa-
tients with Transitional Cell Carcinoma of the Urothelium” (1988) 82:4 J Clin Invest
1454.
98 “Methods for Prevention and Treatment of Mucositis wth Granulocyte Colony Stimu-
lating Factor”, US Patent No 4961926, (19 November 1987), online: United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office <http://www.patft.uspto.gov>.
99 Office of Technology Development, “Success Stories”, online: Memorial Sloan-Ketter-
ing Cancer Center <http://www.mskcc.org/research/office-technology-develop-
ment/success-stories>.
100 Mari Serebrov, “Amgen Running to Win in Both Lanes of Biosimilar Race” BioWorld,
online: BioWorld <http://www.bioworld.com/content/amgen-running-win-both-lanes-
biosimilar-race-0>.
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MSK is the second-highest ranked cancer hospital globally,101 and by 2004,
its R&D funding was fully dependent on its royalties from patent US 4961926 A:
approximately 25 percent of MSK’s financial assets. Rather than enduring the 20-
year patent term, MSK sold 80 percent of its royalty interest to Royalty Pharma for
an upfront payment of US $405 million in 2004. This enabled MSK to construct a
new facility for further cancer research.
Royalty Pharma, the largest of these companies, has interests in over 30 prod-
ucts, including blockbusters like Humira (adalimumab), Remicade (infliximab),
Atripla/Truvada (emtricitabine, tenofovir), Januvia (sitagliptin) and Rituxan (ritux-
imab). It has assets of over $8 billion as of May 2012, of which $4.1 billion is
securitized debt with the acquired royalty streams of approved drugs serving as
collateral. All three rating agencies have rated its most recent debt issue, a success-
ful offering of $600 million with excellent terms, “investment grade.” This is an
important designation, rendering the debt eligible for purchase under the policies of
institutional investors like pension funds, endowments and foundations. Despite
broader market turmoil, its received royalties performed 10 percent better than
forecasted.
This concludes the discussion of royalty securitization companies. See Appen-
dix C for examples of a portfolio of assets, since adopted in Canada by firms like
DRI Capital in Toronto, as opposed to the single asset issued by Yale, Zerit. See
also Appendices C and D for a model of the patent-backed security portfolio.
(ii) Mega funds
The above model for royalty securitization companies illustrates the potential
to stimulate innovation and economic growth in the life sciences sector, over and
above the returns experienced through traditional financial instruments, by collater-
alizing the royalty streams of pharmaceutical patents. While the economic benefits
presented by this first model are clear, they are limited to indirect stimulation of
innovation in the life sciences sector — they monetize revenue-generating, late
stage IP assets, the proceeds of which can be used to invest in new seed-stage R&D
or its translation into commercialized products.
An alternative patent-backed security exists, however, which is capable of
monetizing early-stage, pre-clinical research. Although this is the most risky form
of innovation, it also possesses the greatest potential to yield innovative therapies
with significant public health benefits. While royalty securitization companies in-
vest in approved products and candidates in late-stage clinical development, they
do not engage innovation at the seed-stage.102 It is at this stage that the most promi-
nent public health discoveries are made, with the most expansive potential. Rather
than constraining this vital early-stage research to the current limits of traditional
financing, patent-backed securitization — is the ideal financial instrument to stimu-
late investment and innovation as the focus shifts to early, and more uncertain,
stages of drug development.
101 Top-Ranked Hospitals for Cancer, online: US News & World Report
<http://health.usnews.com/best-hospitals/rankings/cancer>.
102 Fernandez, Stein & Lo, “Biomedical Research”, supra note 22 at 964.
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The model best suited for translating all stages of innovation into commercial-
ized products assumes the form of the “mega fund,” recently proposed by Andrew
Lo of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.103 Similar to a royalty securitiza-
tion company, a large, diversified portfolio or SPV is created, with the additional
requirement that it fund more speculative, early-stage R&D in exchange for a per-
centage of future royalties or proceeds from the subsequent sale of the IP. This
novel asset class is described as a “research-backed obligation” (RBO). Assets in-
clude the initial capital raised from investors, all after-acquired R&D and licenses,
and all profits generated by those activities or their later sale. The full range of
development, from preclinical research to new drug applications, is covered by this
new asset class. Financing for these portfolios is structured as a combination of
both equity and securitized debt,104 including royalty interests and licensing
agreements.
(A) Risk Diversification for Equity Holders Through Tranches
Speculative, early-stage RBOs, with higher potential default rates, do not pre-
sent risk-reward profiles as favorable as their AAA-rated later-stage counterparts,
like Pfizer’s Enbrel, a rheumatoid arthritis medication accounting for 32 percent of
DRI Capital’s portfolio value. Many institutions, like pension funds, are not permit-
ted to invest in non-investment grade assets, effectively excluding early-stage re-
search from the market.
Financial engineering can address this. The answer to securing capital for both
of these risk levels in the life sciences sector is diversification — a tool used exten-
sively in finance, but not, as of yet, applied to biomedical innovation as proposed
by Andrew Lo. By separating these different classes of risk — early and late-stage
discoveries — into distinct classes or “tranches,” the mega fund balances risk and
expected return, which satisfies a much broader palate for investors, generating ac-
cess to all stages of the pipeline.
Tranches are ordered from senior, which must be satisfied first, to junior. If
the assets generate insufficient cash flow to satisfy all promised payments to bond-
holders, the most senior tranche will be paid first, until the available cash is ex-
hausted. Correspondingly, the senior tranche is the least likely to suffer losses, and
has the lowest risk and offers the lowest yield; this tranche is most attractive to
risk-sensitive investors like money market funds, banks, and smaller pension
funds.105 More junior tranches with higher loss and correspondingly higher yields
are attractive to risk-tolerant investors like large pension funds, endowments, and
high-net-worth private investors.106 Finally, the most junior tranche is often struc-
tured as equity, and has no promised payments, but unlimited upside potential once
bondholders are repaid in full; the “equity tranche” is palatable to the most risk-
tolerant investors, including hedge funds and deep pocketed institutional inves-
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid. at 969.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
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tors.107 The size and order of tranches is known as the SPV’s “capital structure,”
and supports a more flexible framework for securing financing in the life sciences
sector: regardless of how risk-averse an investor is, there is likely a satisfactory
tranche within the SPV.108
RBOs can also be structured to have varying maturities, ranging from short-
term (for more impatient investors, like commercial banks) to long-term (for pen-
sion funds and sovereign wealth funds). By allowing for a range of maturities, a
mega fund provides a more palatable portfolio for a broader cross section of inves-
tors. Simultaneously, the shorter-term pressures of generating earnings and prepar-
ing for an initial public-equity offering are reduced, which might otherwise lead to
a distressed sale of promising early-stage assets.109 Typical securitizations employ
debt maturities of 15 years or less; for example, in 2007, DRI Capital issued $356
million of 8- and 15-year bonds backed by royalty rights to pharmaceuticals Enbrel,
Remicade, Preotact, and FluMist.110
(c) Benefits
(i) Patent Holders
(A) Limited Credit Exposure
A bankruptcy-remote vehicle (SPV) minimizes the credit exposure of the bor-
rowing entity. Because the underlying asset is treated as severable, the loan is usu-
ally non-recourse, and the borrower, shielded. Investor, credit analyst, and lender
concerns of creditworthiness decreases in proportion to their concern with underly-
ing asset quality.111
(B) Lower Cost of Capital and Improved Capital Structure and
Ratings
Delinking assets also permits access to capital markets at higher-grade debt
levels than those obtainable through traditional sources like VC, which may reduce
dilution to existing shareholders. Lowering debt coupons, and moving debt off-bal-
ance-sheet, reduces overall debt service levels and improves coverage ratios.
As outlined in Section III, the ability to secure loans against intangible assets
like IP becomes particularly relevant for early-stage companies in the biomedical
sector. Credit ratings essentially determine a security’s level of protection against
credit loss; both in absolute terms, and vis-a-vis other categories of ratings. If the
pro forma payment of royalties to the SPV is quantifiable and demonstrably capa-
ble of supporting interest payments on the issuance of bonds, the SPV can be evalu-
ated at a higher rate. While an originator, such as a start-up or educational institu-
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Finally, credit enhancements, minimizing default risk by ensuring fulfillment
of payment and access to underlying sources of credit, can contribute to a higher
investment rating. These are either internal cash reserve accounts, established by
the originator, or more expensive external finance, from traditional sources like
banks. Credit enhancements fully exploit the security’s commercial potential in two
ways: increasing the likelihood of reaching maturity without default, a high credit
rating is more likely. Secondly, it protects assets as a last line of defense in the
event of default.
(C) Increased Liquidity
A primary benefit is the patent holder’s liberation from the term of the licens-
ing agreement, generating immediate net cash proceeds for R&D, facility/asset
modernization, debt repayment, and working capital requirements.
(D) Greater Leverage of Intellectual Property
Securitization leverages underexploited IP assets and harnesses their value.
(E) Tool in Corporate Finance, Mergers and Acquisitions
Recently, life sciences companies have focused on risk reduction and in-
creased operating efficiency, establishing reliable revenue streams by engaging in
an increasing number of mergers, acquisitions, consolidations, licensing deals, and
joint ventures.112
Patents communicate asset picture and earnings potential to the financial com-
munity;113 aware of the effect of patents on financial and competitive advantage,
analysts examine IP capabilities when evaluating earnings potential and competi-
tive prospects.114 Royalties are a very strong asset in mergers and acquisitions, and
assets with certified valuation and documented, delinked profitability are even
more useful as leverage in M&A transactions and leveraged buyouts. A patent-
backed security may also fund acquisition, issuing debt collateralized by IP in a
target company to achieve an IP-leveraged buyout.
(F) Flexibility of Debt Finance
Debt finance can be more “patient” than private or public equity by specifying
longer maturities; ten- to twenty- year maturities are not atypical for corporate
bonds.115 As an example, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology issued $750
million in 100-year bonds at the historically low rate of 5.623 percent. VC horizons
112 Ibid.
113 Kevin G Rivette & David Kline, “Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property”
(2000) Harv Bus Rev, online: PCT Capital
<http://www.pctcapital.com/pdfs/Harvard.pdf> [New Value].
114 Ibid.
115 Fernandez, Stein & Lo, “Biomedical Research”, supra note 22 at 965.
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are considerably shorter, as are the quarterly earnings cycles and intra-daily price
fluctuations of public companies.116
Bonds issued with different maturities can accommodate different investment
horizons and investors. By tailoring its investment horizon to suit the programs
within the portfolio, early-stage research can be emancipated from financially
driven business deadlines, and permitted to follow the most scientifically produc-
tive path.117
This is of particular import to the life sciences sector, where untimely interrup-
tions due to financial constraints destroy considerable economic value — even their
potential can alter strategic research direction during early-stage discovery. Tailor-
ing horizons eliminates these effects while maintaining financial discipline with pe-
riodic interest payments.118
(ii) Originators, Underwriters, Lenders, and Insurers
Early entrants to the patent-backed securitization industry can claim prime ter-
ritory in the market, and develop the experience to control deal flow later on. As
the market develops, rewards could be substantial. Lenders and insurers could reap
similar benefits. Greater risk diversification of existing portfolios would also be
permitted.
(iii) Investors, Traders and Speculators
(A) Bankruptcy-Remoteness
Bankruptcy concerns are dictated by the structure of transactions underlying
the SPV. Where legal ownership of payment rights is transferred, a sufficient nexus
exists between the SPV and the asset to ward off threats of bankruptcy. A more
limited bundle of rights, in the form of licensing, can be complex. This is addressed
in Section IV.
(B) Facilitation of Niche Investments: An A La Carte Approach
Permitting Refined Bets on Technology
Securitization permits unbundling of technology risk from management and
other operational risk, facilitating the flow of capital into smaller, discrete units,
which can afford an improved risk/reward profile.119 This a la carte approach to
risk permits refined bets on technology, allowing direct participation and specula-
tion in narrow niches, or specific patents, rather than buying into the whole busi-
ness. The liquidity of technology shares or options is superior to the usual sale or
IPO.
There are limitless applications of this type of financial technology, including
SWIPS (IP Swaps) creating cash flows from non-correlated technology, and novel
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instruments differ from now popular industry holders, which retain all the business
risks (market, operational, and financial) of the companies, of which they are com-
prised; they replace these risks with the opportunity to bet on or hedge with the
underlying IP itself.120
(C) Decreased Market Volatility and Investment Risk
The decoupling of IP from business risks could have a salubrious effect on the
market for, and development of, life sciences products. Excess speculation and vol-
atility in the late 90s stemmed from the inability to value IP. The creation of a
secondary market for IP, and the parallel rise in insurance products, will decrease
volatility and risk, resulting in proportionate increases in investment and return and
lowered costs of capital.
(iv) Economy: Competitive Economies of Scope and Scale
While traditional finance’s risk adverse decision-making is economically ra-
tional decision-making, it becomes perverse on a larger scale. Innovation is essen-
tial to a high-performing economy, excelling on measures like income per capita,
productivity, social program quality, and the functioning of healthcare.121 When
capital markets systematically suffocate innovation, the longitudinal impacts can be
devastating. As these jurisdictions develop innovation-related business methods,
they specialize in knowledge-intensive, high-value-added goods and services and
achieve insurmountable productivity gains relative to those who fail to innovate.122
Given the anticipated demand of current healthcare consumer demographics, de-
pendency on foreign supply will exact inordinate healthcare costs on jurisdictions
failing to implement securities legislation for innovation.
As an example, the passage of Proposition 71, spearheading innovation in
stem cell research, forecasts a ten-year, $3 billion windfall for California. Termed
the new “gold rush”, Boston’s research and investment community emigrated to
harness this growth.123 While Canada’s federal R&D budget ($7 billion annually)
is one of the highest, it ranks 14th of 17 countries for innovation,124 and its global
competitiveness continues to slide.125
As demonstrated above, securitization can establish a secondary IP market,
decreasing volatility, risk, and capital cost, and increasing investment, innovation,
and return. As more companies leverage intangible assets and seek to maximize the
unrealized value of their asset portfolios through licensing, selling, or acquiring
technology, a more mature capital market for IP will develop. IP promises to be the
120 Ibid.
121 The Conference Board of Canada, Innovation (2012), online: Conference Board of
Canada <http://www.conferenceboard.ca/hcp/details/innovation.aspx>.
122 Ibid.
123 Kristen Philipkoski, The Stem Cell Gold Rush Wired (4 November 2004), online at:
Wired <http://www.wired.com>.
124 Mary Bitti, “Overcoming Obstacles to Commercialization” Financial Post (13 May
2007), online: Financial Post <http://business.financialpost.com>.
125 Ibid.
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driving force behind commercial success in the future, and economies which fail to
effectively legislate this development and create opportunities for effective IP man-
agement will lag behind those economies that do. This will have drastic implica-
tions for not only the efficiency of capital markets, but in stimulating technological
innovation and generating access to the products of that innovation.
(v) Public Health: Increased Innovative Medical Products with Reduced
Time to Market
IP-backed securities, and accompanying reform of the relevant disclosure re-
quirements in securities legislation, present a meaningful avenue for establishing
this change in the life sciences sector. For the above reasons, the more efficient
capital markets facilitated by patent securitization can spur corresponding efficien-
cies in public health. More effective capital flow can increase life cycle drug devel-
opment efficiencies, decrease time to market, and optimize pipeline value and re-
turn on investment (ROI).
Furthermore, incremental reform of securities legislation can serve to funnel
capital to those areas where it is most needed. Increased investment in early-stage
drug development can effectively combat problems concomitant with existing busi-
ness models, like “ever greening”. With its inherent ability to efficiently allocate
capital to discrete units of technology most likely to succeed, patent-backed securi-
ties can supersede the “guessing game” of the current biotech business model, at-
taining a higher number of “wins”. Such funds can handle risk more adeptly than
small pharmaceutical firms dependent on development of one or two key com-
pounds,126 and can efficiently produce both novel therapies and immediate liquid-
ity for the rapid turnover of early-stage innovation. Despite the “valley of death” of
translational research, the doubling of R&D spending — from $68 billion in 2002
to $127 billion in 2010 — has produced a 20-year backlog of oncology compounds
waiting to be investigated.127 This enables rapid scale-up and gains in technologi-
cal advances, and the potential to outpace competitors in the modern “gold rush”.
Third and finally, the “mega fund” model — unlike business models polarized
to strong market-to-book ratios like those of Roche or Genentech — secures its
ROI from robust life science technology, not allegiance to another arbitrary deter-
minant. Rather than a mutual fund restricted to investment in publicly traded com-
panies, a mega fund does not discriminate between startups, companies, royalty
streams, IP, or other assets.128
(d) Conclusion
Reflecting a growing level of comfort with royalty deals as a funding source,
the dollar value of deals more than quadrupled to $1.7 billion in 2008 from $400
126 Fernandez, Stein & Lo, “Biomedical Research”, supra note 22 at 965.
127 Felix Salmon, “Can Securitization Save Medical R&D?” Reuters (1 October 2012),
online: Reuters <http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/10/01/can-securitization-
save-medical-rd/>.
128 Fernandez, Stein & Lo, “Biomedical Research”, supra note 22 at 965.
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million in 2006.129 Global pharmaceutical sales were estimated as high as $800
billion in 2009, with the patent licensing generating estimated annual royalties in
excess of US $100 billion.130
The life sciences sector’s size and growth potential, the significant financing
and capital needs of “drug royalty rights” owners, and the anticipated market de-
mand for bio therapeutics, speak to the value patent-backed securities. The life sci-
ences sector stands to experience improved innovation and growth as a result of the
above benefits, accruing to three classes: patent holders; originators, underwriters,
lenders, and insurers; and investors, traders, and speculators. Finally, economic and
public health advantages warrant consideration of incremental securities law reform
facilitating these securities.
In Section V, a proposal is presented for incremental securities law reform,
comprised of modified disclosure requirements appropriate to patent-backed securi-
ties. Several indicia will be presented which achieve this objective within the ex-
isting mechanisms, scope, and legislative purposes of securities law.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR INCREMENTAL SECURITIES LAW
REFORM: MODIFIED DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR
PATENT-BACKED SECURITIES
(a) Introduction
While the proposed methods of securitization played a role in the financial
crisis, it has also provided compelling evidence that, if used responsibly, it is a
highly effective means of gathering large amounts of capital in a relatively short
period of time, which can play a transformative role in socially important initia-
tives. Rather than shying away from such instruments, a more measured response
may be to acknowledge their strengths, address their weaknesses and use them
wisely to meet the most pressing social challenges. Perhaps the most effective rem-
edy may be to recognize the potential for speculation to emerge in any industry,
and to ensure that those investors who are ill-suited to such boom/bust cycles do
not become victims of their destructive forces. More positively, if speculative be-
havior is a fact of economic life, it may be worthwhile to redirect some of this
energy toward social priorities such as reducing the burden of disease.
It is in this respect that the role of securities law in regulating deployment of
capital becomes important. Securities law seeks to improve investor protection and
market efficiency. Regulation of disclosure for intellectual property, like the patent,
is not clearly developed. Before the advent of modern securities law, however, tan-
gible asset disclosure was not necessarily simple. It was only through legislative
reform that enormous amounts of economic activity now proceed safely and effi-
ciently. The problem of intangible asset securitization is a subset of a larger issue,
129 Brian Gormley, “Royalty Pharma Deals Aren’t Just for Start-Ups Anymore” The Wall
Street Journal (30 September 2009), online: Wall Street Journal
<http://blogs.wsj.com>.
130 Malcolm S Dorris, Jostava AO Strathman & Kira N Brereton, “Securitization of Phar-
maceutical Royalties: A Prescription for Market Growth” Dechert On Point (February
2010), online: Dechert LLP <http://www.dechert.com> [“Pharmaceutical Royalties”].
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which is how the law can best facilitate capital flow for enterprises with valuable
capital other than tangible assets. Due to uncertainty in cash flow forecasts and the
specific risk factors of IP assets, an assessment of the value and risk profile of
patents is one of the most critical components of securities reform.
Disclosure for a special purpose issuer of asset-backed securities will gener-
ally explain the nature, performance and servicing of the underlying pool of finan-
cial assets, the structure of the securities and dedicated cash flows, and any third
party or internal support arrangements established to protect holders of the asset-
backed securities from losses associated with non-performance of the financial as-
sets or disruptions in payment.
Specific requirements are established for asset-backed securities under s.10.3
of National Instrument 41-101 for Prospectus Requirements. The nature and extent
of required disclosure may vary depending on the type, quality and attributes of the
assets comprising the pool, and on the contractual arrangements, and overall struc-
ture of the transaction, through which holders of the asset-backed securities take
their interest in such assets. Generally, however, an issuer of asset-backed securi-
ties should, when preparing its long form prospectus, include full, true and plain
disclosure regarding the financial assets underlying the securities, the originator of
the assets, and the material attributes of the underlying securities.131
In the following section, a series of indicia will be proposed that can serve as
reliable indicators of patent value, thus providing investors with information on the
underlying assets in an SPV and allowing for calculation of returns. This will con-
tribute to a valuation of portfolios that reflects market reality, rather than hypothe-
ses.132 This will also buffer against the likelihood of sharp declines and panic sell-
ing when the market’s valuation differs from the portfolio manager’s.
(b) Measures of Intangible Asset Value: Criteria for Inclusion in
Disclosure Requirements
Baruch Lev proposes that any individual issuer should present measures pos-
sessing three criteria. These criteria will be used to present several indicia as incre-
mental reforms to disclosure requirements for patent-backed securities. It is sug-
gested that providing these indicia would fulfill the purposes of the Securities Act
by allowing full, true and plain disclosure of material facts relating to the issued
security’s underlying assets.
131 Ontario Securities Commission, Statement of Priorities for fiscal year 2009-2010, on-
line: Ontario Securities Commission
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/About/wwd_2009-2010_statement-of-priori-
ties.pdf>; Ontario Securities Commission, Securities Regulatory Proposals Stemming
from the 2007-08 Credit Market Turmoil and its Effect on the ABCP Market in Canada
(October 2008), online: Ontario Securities Commission
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category1/csa_20081006_11-
405_abcp-con-paper.pdf>.
132 Fernandez, Stein & Lo, “Biomedical Research”, supra note 22 at 965.
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(i) Quantitative
Firstly, the indicia should be quantitative, and capable of making a difference
in user decisions. They should be representationally faithful, verifiable, and neutral.
Qualitative aspects, such as patent cross licensing, can be provided as an annex.
(ii) Standardized
They should be standardized, comparable for valuation and benchmarking
purposes.
(iii) Empirically Relevant
Thirdly, and most importantly, the indicia should be confirmed by empirical
evidence as relevant attributes, measurable with sufficient reliability. A significant
statistical association may be established, for example, between those indicia and
indicators of corporate value, like stock return or productivity improvement.133
(c) Proposed Modified Disclosure Requirements: Indicia for Patent
Valuation
A set of modified disclosure requirements enabling companies, investors, and
finance professionals to promote, develop, and profit from intangible asset finance
in the form of patent-backed securities, will now be presented.
There are 22 in total, falling under: Financial Information; Item 29: Other Ma-
terial Facts; Item 21: Proof of Risk Factors; Item 23: Legal Proceedings and Regu-
latory Action; Item 27: Material Contracts; and Item 19: Audit Committees and
Corporate Governance. Should supplementary information be required, existing
mechanisms of confidential disclosure and material change legislation134 can bal-
ance the ends of investor protection with disclosure proving “unduly detrimental”
to the issuer.
(i) Financial Information
(A) Introduction: Financial Information in the Intangible Asset
Context
Under s. 56 OSA(1), “A prospectus shall provide full, true, and plain disclo-
sure of all material facts relating to the securities issued or proposed to be distrib-
uted.” and (2) “The prospectus shall contain or be accompanied by . . . financial
statements.”
Fair value for appraisal purposes means “intrinsic value”, and while “market
value may be considered in proper cases in determining intrinsic value . . . [it] is
not the sole or basic test . . .”.135 This is nowhere more true than in the realm of
133 Baruch Lev, Intangibles: Management, Measurement, and Reporting (Washington:
Bookings Institution Press, 2001).
134 Securities Act, supra note 1 at s. 75(3); General Prospectus Requirements, OSC NI 51-
102 (29 November 2012), s. 7.1(2) [NI 51-102].
135 Roessler v. Security Savings & Loan Co. (1947), 72 N.E. 2d 259.
310   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [11 C.J.L.T.]
intangible assets. The particular obstacles faced in the valuation of IP assets will be
addressed here. It is for this reason that the cornerstone of both an effective IP
strategy firm, as well as in the capital raising process, is a company-wide IP audit.
This requires the coordination of a wide range of players, operating together in a
well-documented and fluid process: legal counsel, corporate planners, financial
staff, research and development managers, senior management, engineers, scien-
tists, marketing staff, and licensing staff.136 Identifying all of the core and non-core
intangible assets that could currently bring value to a company permits manage-
ment to create an effective IP strategy coinciding with company objectives and pri-
orities, as well as to establish a clear picture — equivalent to the financial informa-
tion requirement under the prospectus legislation — to facilitate the raising of debt
and equity through a patent-backed securitization with appropriate risk
diversification.
(i) Intellectual Property Audit
While the traditional auditing procedure usually evaluates tangible assets in
financial statements, such statements are incomplete to the extent that they fail to
provide a realistic appraisal of intangible IP assets.137
To correct this problem, an IP audit should be undertaken in order to meet a
series of objectives, including: (1) determination of the origin of IP assets, (2) de-
termination of the extent of the owner’s interest in the IP rights of those assets; (3)
determination of the scope of IP rights that any third party may have in the assets;
(4) evaluation of the company’s policies and procedures for creating and protecting
its IP rights in its assets; (5) analysis of defects in existing IP assets which either
have diminished, or may in the future diminish, the value of those assets; (6) insti-
tution of corrective measures to eliminate those defects; (7) provision of recom-
mendations to help restore full value to any flawed IP assets; (8) recommendation
of new policies and procedures to provide more expansive protection for future
creation and management of the company’s core IP assets; (9) preclusion or lessen-
ing of potential liability from third party infringement claims which may result
from the company’s development of a new product; and (10) a realistic financial
valuation of the company’s IP assets.138
As an example, investors must ascertain who is responsible for maintaining
and enforcing the patents, and whether the party has the necessary resources to do
so. Whether the underlying license agreements account for related technology de-
veloped subsequent to the execution date of the license agreement is also an impor-
tant factor. Other measures might include: a certification of up-to-date maintenance
fees; a review of chain of title, an assessment of the validity of claims in the subject
patents; and a public database search for patent infringement litigation.139 A thor-
ough assessment may include disclosure of post-issuance patent office activity neg-
136 Gollin, Monetizing Intellectual Property, supra note 13.
137 Ibid.
138 Venable LLP, The Effective Management and Value Maximization of Intellectual Pro-
perty (1 April 2000), online: Venable LLP <http://www.venable.com> [Effective
Management].
139 Dorris, Strathman & Brereton, “Pharmaceutical Royalties”, supra note 130.
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atively impacting the scope of the patent claims at issue, namely, any interference,
re-examination or reissue; an analysis of the claims in the subject patents relative to
the royalty-generating commercial activities to gauge whether they might provide a
commercially valuable exclusivity for the relevant market; and a right-to use analy-
sis to assess whether the licensee will be free to practice the royalty generating
commercial activities without infringing the patent rights of another party.140 It
may also involve an assessment of a third party’s ability to “design around” the
patent claims to appropriate the technology disclosed in the specification without
infringing the patent claims. The methods of assessment should ideally be repeated
for each national jurisdiction in which the subject royalty-generating commercial
activities are likely to occur.
The IP audit is sufficiently quantitative, standardized, and empirically relevant
to serve as reliable indicia of the assets underlying the issued security.
(ii) Strength of Credit Enhancement Mechanisms
Finally, the strength of the credit enhancement mechanisms, the flexibility of
the deal architecture, and the adoption of a portfolio diversification strategy are
other key factors relevant to the success of a securitization. Enhancements mini-
mize risk of default by ensuring payment, increasing the likelihood of reaching ma-
turity, and protecting assets in the event of default. In this respect, their existence,
either in the form of internal or external cash reserves, is a quantitative, standard-
ized, and empirically relevant fact material to the IP underlying the security, and
worthy of disclosure in the prospectus.
(iii) Flexibility of Deal Architecture
Flexibility and customization of the vehicle can add solidity to the deal struc-
ture and increase the overall probability of success of the transaction. The ability to
add assets to the asset pool increases deal flexibility. Furthermore, the size and
order of tranches, known as the “capital structure”, supports a more flexible frame-
work for securing financing in the life sciences sector: regardless of how risk-
averse an investor is, there is likely a satisfactory tranche within the SPV.141 In this
respect, information about the capital structure can also prove relevant to the likely
profitability of issued securities. This information is sufficiently quantitative, stan-
dardized, and empirically relevant to warrant disclosure.
(iv) Portfolio Diversification Strategy
Patent-backed securities, and particularly those in the business of early-stage
life sciences, are always vulnerable to the risk of default or underperformance on
royalty streams. This risk is mitigated by the diversity of the underlying patents
themselves. This diversification lowers the risk that the underperformance of any
one income stream will result in the deal’s default. To address this, the number of
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(B) Item 29: Other Material Facts — Evidence-Based Indicia of Patent
Value
(i) Length of the Patent Term
Discussed in section (B)(ii).
(ii) Future-Oriented Financial Information — Sales According to Patent
Duration
A key disclosure requirement to investors regarding the financial viability of
the underlying asset is the length of the patent, directly analogous to existing secur-
ities regulation-surrounding reserves in oil and gas royalty trusts. There are a finite,
verifiable number of years remaining in the patent term associated with each under-
lying patent; this is comparable across various patents. Finally, the length of the
patent term is directly tied to the ability to recoup profits from its associated mo-
nopoly. Disclosure requirements can be sufficiently quantitative, standardized, and
empirically relevant.
Form 51-101F2 (Appendix F), required to be included with all oil and gas
royalties, which consists of a report on reserves data by independent qualified
reserves evaluator. This is based on statutorily defined disclosure requirements by
independently qualified auditors and experts as well as management. An analogous
evaluation could be provided, for example, in the existing patent itself, which will
clearly delineate the patent term. This protects investors in oil and gas by clearly
delineating empirical data over the lifetime of the reserve demonstrating profitabil-
ity over time (Appendix G). In the intangible-asset market, analogous data could be
established, taking into account market forces and other variables idiosyncratic to
that market. This could be done by an independent evaluator, with a specialty in
that area and competent in market analysis and valuation, to ensure objectivity,
comparability, and empirical relevance of these indicia.
As such, investors could have greater confidence in their investment and in the
capital markets, while simultaneously contributing to the fairness and efficiency of
those markets. Securities regulation can penalize any material misstatement with
regard to this patent expiry period, or the failure to disclose any material changes to
said period.142
It also remains open to question whether, or to what extent, patent-backed se-
curity issuers should be required to disclose the lengths of patents on competi-
tors — which also implies generics and the drop-down effect on the underlying as-
set in question.
(iii) Regulatory Data Exclusivity Periods
Regulatory approval is required for a new drug application (NDA) or biologics
license application (BLA) before marketing a new drug or biologic in Canada. Mar-
ket exclusivity may be accorded for a limited time, known as the data exclusivity
period. This can occur independently of, or in addition to, the term of patent-related
market protection.
142 Securities Act, supra note 1 at s. 75(3); NI 51-102, supra note 134 at s. 7.1(2).
A PROPOSAL FOR INCREMENTAL SECURITIES LAW REFORM   313
The Federal Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Data Protection Provi-
sions of ss. 30(3) of the Food and Drug Regulations143 in 2009, permitting eight
years of market exclusivity for innovative new drugs in Canada. Approval will not
be granted for a generic version of a previously approved version of the drug for
that period, regardless of patent protection. The scope and length of this protection
is quantifiable, standardized, and empirically relevant on the same grounds as pat-
ent protection, and as such should be part of the information provided to investors
regarding the underlying intangible asset class.
(iv) Number of Patent Citations as Indicators of Stock Performance
A company’s intrinsic value is not often recognized by investors. In the phar-
maceutical sector, one might expect the most appropriate indicator of this value to
be R&D expenses. However, a company’s periodic R&D expenditures as the sole
innovation-related item required to be disclosed in financial statements is too
coarse an indicator for valuation of the nature, quality, and expected benefits of its
science and technology efforts.144 Investors cannot glean from R&D cost data the
substantial differences between companies in terms of innovative capabilities,145
and various innovative activities are not adequately captured within the formal clas-
sification of R&D in existing securities legislation, and as such are not reported
separately to investors. These indicia lack the requisite quality of possessing empir-
ical relevance, and thus are excluded from the material facts otherwise included in
the modified disclosure requirements.
Meta-analyses reveal that, in fact, the most significant correlation with patent
value is, in fact, the number of citations it receives from subsequent patents.146 In
search of timely and relevant indicators of companies’ innovative capabilities and
outcomes, Deng, Lev, and Narin identified patent citations to be useful indicators
for investment research and analysis of R&D-intensive companies in a ten-year
longitudinal study.
A typical U.S. patent cites about eight earlier U.S. patents, one or two foreign
patents, and one or two non-patent references, usually to scientific papers and
meetings.147 Patents most frequently cited by others are usually of high financial
value; companies owning those patents are likely to benefit from their commercial
exploitation. Thus, Zhen et al. argue, the best time for investors to buy stock in a
company is not once its value has been fully realized by the market, but when
enough information is available to make an educated decision about the company’s
prospects at a point in time prior to when everyone else has realized the company’s
potential value. This study identifies that time as when the company’s patents are
becoming cited frequently by other patent seekers, often midway into the product
development process or slightly beforehand.
143 CRC, c. 870, s. C.08.004.1.
144 Z Deng, B Lev & F Narin, “Science and Technology as Predictors of Stock Perform-
ance” (1999) 55:3 Financ Anal J 20.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid at 21.
147 Ibid.
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The Lanjouw-Schankerman quality index is a composite index built on the
number of claims, backward references, forward citations received in the first five
years of patent life, and family scope. The index is correlated with the economic
value of a patent and can be considered an indirect measure of the probability that a
patent can generate enough cash flows to be securitized.148 This index serves to
incorporate indicia 7–10, and serves as a quantitative, standardized, and verifiable
measure grounded in empirical relevance.
(v) Number of Backward Citations
A meta-analysis by Harhoff et al. demonstrates several other evidence-based
indicators of patent value. In their study, the measure of references to the patent
literature (backward citations) carries significant positive coefficients in all techni-
cal fields.
(vi) Number in Patent Family
Discussed in Section (B)(vii).
(vii) Ratio of Successful Opposition Cases
Measures of family size and observed outcomes of opposition cases contribute
to an approximation of patent value, and logically so — a successful defense
against opposition and annulment claims is a particularly strong predictor. Presum-
ably, valuable patents are more likely to be attacked in this process, and the
stronger patent rights survive, amounting to a two-tiered selection process with a
highly informative outcome.149
This information is readily available and easily assimilated intro prospectus
requirements to both permit informed valuation of profitability by investors, while
also stimulating innovation, economic growth, and the efficiency of capital mar-
kets. In sum, indicia of backward citations, family size, and outcome of opposition
cases meet the three requirements of being quantitative, standardized, and empiri-
cally relevant.
(viii) Drug Classification — New Biologic Entity (NBE) or New Chemical
Entity (NCE)
Since new biological entities treat targeted diseases, they are more difficult to
develop and manufacture than new chemical entities, and thus impose greater barri-
ers to entry.
Empirical evidence also generally supports the first-mover advantage theory in
pharmaceuticals, first-in-class drugs have a competitive advantage over follower
molecules that are later market entrants.150 New biologic entities are most often
148 JO Lanjouw & M Schankerman, “Patent Quality and Research Productivity: Measuring
Innovation with Multiple Indicators” (2004) 114 Econ J 441.
149 D Harhoff et al, “Citations, Family Size, Opposition and the Value of Patent Rights”
(2003) 32 Res Pol’y 1343 at 1345.
150 C Odasso & E Ughetto, Patent-backed Securities, supra note 81.
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first-in-class, and thus have a significantly higher likelihood of sustained revenue
gains and market share than new chemical entities.151 Drug classification is suffi-
ciently quantitative, standardized, and empirically relevant to warrant inclusion in
disclosure.
(ix) Market Size
Biomedical products competing in large markets with low competition are su-
perior candidates for securitization, as they are poised to be more successful at gen-
erating sufficient cash flow.152 The size of markets to which SPV assets belong can
be determined by identifying their four-digit Anatomical Therapeutic Class (ATC)
code, the average worldwide sales of that ATC according to industry data, and de-
termining a corresponding score for that asset. Data for sales by ATC exist in
databases (See Appendix H).
For example, in the previous case study of Royalty Pharma’s Neulasta® pat-
ent, a score would be assigned as follows. The ATC of Neulasta is L03AA13: an
immunostimulant in the “antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents” class. This
class is not in the top 20 for worldwide sales. Thus, Neulasta would be awarded a
higher score for market size. This score is sufficiently quantitative, standardized,
and empirically relevant for disclosure.
(x) Competition in Therapeutic Class
As mentioned in Indicium (12), Drug Classification, the first-mover advantage
favors earlier market entrants. The level of competition can be determined by iden-
tifying the asset’s Anatomical Therapeutic Class, and then identifying the number
of compounds in the same class that were already marketed in that jurisdiction prior
to approval of the asset.153 By determining the number of earlier market entrants,
the difference in their residual market life, and the different types of molecules, a
score can be determined which is sufficiently quantitative, standardized, and empir-
ically relevant to warrant disclosure.
(C) Item 21: Risk Factors: Risk of Technological Obsolescence
This relates to the appropriate extent of disclosure regarding “material
changes” in the market. Although this was held to be irrelevant in Danier, such
implications may take on an added meaning in the pharmaceutical context, where
more affordable or efficient access to a life saving medical treatment can quickly
relegate a pharmaceutical patent to the Dark Ages.154 Although new blockbuster
diabetes medications were completed as recently as several years ago, for example,
the discovery of IGF-2 and the underlying genetic makeup responsible for the ab-
sence of insulin production in the body may lead to a cure — rendering any subse-




154 Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., 2007 SCC 44, 2007 CarswellOnt 6445, 2007 CarswellOnt
6446, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 331 (S.C.C.).
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In relation to investor protection, the intention should not be to guarantee an
investor would not incur a loss. Rather, the intention should be for investors to
understand the risks by having the “fullest possible knowledge to enable it to distin-
guish the different types of investment activity available”.155 Furthermore, risk is
mitigated by the disclosure of material facts relating to the appropriate valuation of
patents, indicated in the proposed model above. Those patents possessing the great-
est value within that formula — underlying patent assets with a higher quality in
terms of scope, technical novelty and usefulness, and longer residual patent life, as
discussed in further detail here — are likely to reduce the risk of technical obsoles-
cence and sales losses. As such, two indicia are proposed to be included in the
modified disclosure requirements for securities with an underlying intangible asset
in the form of a life sciences patent.
(i) Proof of Trade-mark Registration
Certain drugs have characteristics which guard against the obsolescence
risk — a primary characteristic being strong brand recognition, made manifest in a
registered trade-mark. While an underlying patented drug has a limited legal life, a
trade-mark may be renewed at 15-year intervals, without limitation, on payment
each time of the necessary renewal fees. The popularity of existing brands can be
difficult for new market entrants to overcome, even if the new product might actu-
ally be superior to the better-known one. This common market phenomenon erects
a high barrier against the entry of would-be competitors, mitigating risk of success-
ful development and marketing of superior products.156
This indicium — proof of a registered trade-mark — complies with Baruch
Lev’s three requirements: it is quantitative, standardized, and empirically relevant.
S.13(1)(a) of the Trade-marks Act establishes legislative requirements for a trade-
mark’s “distinctiveness” (the strength of its brand recognition).157 As of the date of
filing, it must “actually distinguish” the wares, a characteristic which is “acquired
through use” of the mark in Canada.158 An example would be the trade-mark,
“Tylenol”, whose distinctiveness precludes otherwise bioequivalent acetaminophen
from overtaking its monopoly in the life sciences sector. To be successfully regis-
tered under s. 30, an application must include a statement of the specific wares
associated with the mark, the date from which the mark has been used in associated
with said wares, and the intention to use the mark throughout Canada.159 As such,
proof of registration ipso facto demonstrates distinctiveness of a trade-mark, and
thus constitutes acceptable quantitative indicia. It is representationally faithful, ver-
ifiable, and neutral.
In respect of the second criteria of standardization, the Trade-marks Act is
federal legislation, and thus registration can be used to compare the issuer’s associ-
155 Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Securities Legislation in Ontario (To-
ronto: Queen’s Printer, 1965) [the “Kimber Report”] at para 1.12.
156 Dorris, Strathman & Brereton, “Pharmaceutical Royalties”, supra note 130.
157 Trade-marks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13.
158 Boston Pizza International Inc. v. Boston Chicken Inc., 2003 CarswellNat 583, 2003
CarswellNat 2012, [2003] F.C.J. No. 395 (Fed. C.A.).
159 Ibid.
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ated wares with other drug products (which may or may not have trade-marks asso-
ciated with their wares).160
Thirdly, economic effect is felt once trade-mark protection has been granted; a
registered mark is valuable to the “extent that it carries with it some degree of
monopoly power.”161 It is established that a registered trade-mark is empirically
relevant: firms with well-known marks are able to corner the consumer with effec-
tive advertising, put up market entry barriers for other firms, and thus create mo-
nopoly profits.162 This forms the basis for their role in IP law. They provide an
incentive to develop goodwill, as the subsequent grant of a trade-mark monopoly
generates significant economic benefit.
(ii) Clinical Trial Data: Number of Indications/Uses of Pharmaceutical
Patent
Another factor that should be disclosed to investors is the multiple applica-
tions of a drug to a variety of conditions, or for a variety of uses.163 In biomedical
terms, this is described as the “indication” (either approved or “in development”).
A pharmaceutical product with multiple uses increases revenue-producing potential
and helps to alleviate the possible payment stream interruption if a competitor de-
velops a superior drug to treat the primary condition for which the drug was devel-
oped.164 Such information is sufficiently quantitative, standardized, and empiri-
cally relevant to indicate underlying asset value.
(D) Item 23: Legal Proceedings and Regulatory Actions
(i) Litigation and Product Liability Issues
All IP rights, even registered rights, are inherently prone to attacks on their
very validity. This is the systemic and inherent nature of IP law, which confers
limited, but powerful, monopolies in order to increase overall consumer welfare. If
it turns out that a patent should not have been granted due to the existence of prior
art, that a trademark has been permitted to become generic, or that a copyright has
been claimed on unoriginal work, the bargain is broken and the “right” is vulnera-
ble if any attempt is made to enforce it.165 If removed from its actual source, disso-
ciated from its goodwill (perhaps due to bankruptcy) and applied to inferior goods
or services, a trademark may be of very little value, at best, or become invalid at
worst, although this danger varies in severity across different jurisdictions.166 Even
a copyright, the most readily transferable and “liquid” of intellectual properties,
160 Trade-marks Act, supra note 157.
161 AG Papandreou, “The Economic Effect of Trademarks” (1956) 44 Calif L Rev 503 at
504.
162 D Shanahan, “The Trademark Right: Consumer Protection or Monopoly?” (1982) 72
Trademark Rep 233 at 240.
163 Dorris, Strathman & Brereton, “Pharmaceutical Royalties”, supra note 130.
164 Ibid.
165 Knopf, “Security Interests”, supra note 4.
166 Ibid.
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possesses limited value in that his or her moral rights are unassignable; even if
irrevocably waived, those rights can lose value if the author is noncompliant in
participating in adaptations, derivative works, or sequels.167
IP rights that are rendered unenforceable are, rendered, to a proportionate de-
gree, worthless. Illustrations of this include a one-day, 28 percent jump in Affyme-
trix stock price, for example, following settlement of a patent infringement suit.168
Existing securities regulation provides investors with disclosure regarding ex-
isting or pending litigation surrounding the securities. In the context of patent-
backed securities, those provisions should be adapted to the unique context of
pharmaceuticals and the legal challenges launched against drug patent rights. This
information is sufficiently quantitative, standardized, and empirically relevant to
warrant disclosure within the prospectus.
(ii) Clinical Trial Data and Evidence of Regulatory Compliance
Because royalties are based on the sales revenue of a patented pharmaceutical
product, investors need information about any potential changes in regulatory
oversight.
When a sponsor decides it would like to market a drug in Canada, a “New
Drug Submission” (NDS) is filed with the Therapeutic Products Directorate. The
NDS details preclinical and clinical studies, therapeutic claims and side effects, and
other data regarding drug safety, effectiveness, and quality. If the claims are sup-
ported, a Notice of Compliance (NOC) is issued. Once a new drug is on the market,
it remains subject to a continuing and ongoing review and discovery process. Dis-
tributors are required to report any new information relating to adverse effects, or
failure to achieve therapeutic effect, as well as any additional safety information.
The identification of previously unknown issues with a given drug, or inadherence
to manufacturing or quality control requirements, may result in further restrictions
on the manufacture, sale or use of that drug. Certain instances mandate a problem-
atic drug’s market withdrawal, entirely.
Furthermore, product liability lawsuits have commonly led to the voluntary or
mandated withdrawal of pharmaceutical products from the market. Even if the
claim does not result in withdrawal, litigation may significantly devalue associated
royalty rights. In this respect, even if the IP is isolated to an SPV, it is nonetheless
dependent on the revenue generated by royalty payment rights and will be ad-
versely affected if the underlying drug is subject to lawsuits, regulatory restrictions,
or withdrawal from the market.
Existing regulatory mechanisms are available to address the regulatory and
product liability hurdle. Because the regulatory mechanism is already in place
through public registries in both Canada and the US, the administrative function for
reporting this information in a standardized format is readily available. A tailored
continuous disclosure requirement could be imposed for patent-backed securities in
the pharmaceutical industry. Prior to regulatory approval, royalty-backed securities
can be mandated to disclose standardized regulatory information about the underly-
ing assets. To permit flexibility with the evolution of the biotechnology and bio
167 Ibid.
168 Rivette & Kline, “New Value”, supra note 113.
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therapeutics market, such disclosure may include, but need not be limited to,
clinical trial data for Phases I-IV, rates of effectiveness, and comparison to existing
controls in the market. Secondly, following regulatory approval, the patent-backed
security issuer may be mandated to disclose evidence of compliance with any and
all manufacturing and quality control requirements, as well as to disclose the results
of the ongoing standardized regulatory review and discovery process. Such infor-
mation is quantitative, standardized, and empirically relevant to the underlying as-
set class, and thus should warrant inclusion in disclosure requirements.
(E) Item 27: Material Contracts
(i) Degree of Cooperation
Development partnerships, joint ventures, and cross-licensing are common
means of acquiring the necessary technology and resources for commercialization
in the life sciences. These arrangements involve risks, however, associated with
their definition, coordination of common activities and IP management. If issues of
appropriability, IP protection, or information asymmetry arise, frictions can ob-
struct the original value of such collaborations.169 Determining whether an IP asset
was internally developed or licensed out, as well as the number of licensing steps
established until market launch, can provide a sufficiently quantitative, standard-
ized, and empirically relevant measure to warrant disclosure.170
(ii) Executory or Non-Executory Contracts (“Contingent Payment
Rights”) in Bankruptcy
In a patent-backed security, the patent-holder transfers a bundle of rights to an
SPV. Two different circumstances may arise: (1) the SPV can “own” these rights in
a variety of legal forms. It may be the outright owner of the patents themselves, and
receive associated royalties under a license agreement with one of the product mar-
keting companies. (2) With respect to other products in the portfolio, however, the
SPV may possess a more limited bundle of rights — rather than a direct interest in
the related patents, it may instead own various “contingent payment rights”. These
interests would represent the right to receive amounts based on the royalties paya-
ble, pursuant to the licensing of the patents.
Technologies engage in “cross licensing” with competitors, often requiring
use of each other’s patents. Insofar as third party rights are concerned, this in-
troduces complexity: not only from a purely “conveyancing” point of view, but
from a strategic and business viewpoint as well.171 In the case of “contingent pay-
ment rights”, or other interests representing the right to receive amounts based on
royalties, the uncertainty negatively impacts the risk-reward profile. This presents
demonstrable material considerations, which should be made available to investors.
These considerations become particularly important in circumstances of bankruptcy
of any of the parties to the contracts creating the royalty payments rights. The form
169 Odasso & Ughetto, “Patent-backed Securities”, supra note 81.
170 Ibid.
171 Knopf, “Security Interests”, supra note 4.
320   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [11 C.J.L.T.]
in which the SPV owns the royalty payment rights directly impacts how its rights to
receive royalty payments are affected in such circumstances.
More specifically, it is of critical importance whether the contract governing
the payment royalty rates will be deemed an executory or a non-executory contract
by a Bankruptcy Court. Until bankruptcy reform in 2009, it was unclear whether
companies restructuring under the relevant statutes could disclaim IP licenses172.
Pursuant to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA),173 Companies’ Creditors Ar-
rangement Act (CCAA),174 and associated jurisprudence,175 most courts view li-
cense agreements as executory contracts. The CCAA (s. 32(6)) and BIA (s.
65.11(7)) were amended to provide that, as long as co-party obligations in an IP
agreement are fulfilled, a disclaimer does not affect the right to use, or enforce, the
IP.176 In this respect, the protection afforded to licensees is nearly absolute, subject
to any limitations courts read into the provisions.177
However, the 2009 amendments also left open some uncertainties, rendering
licensees at significant risk if a licensor restructures. This should be clearly deline-
ated under Item 27: Material Contracts in order to permit licensees to address po-
tential consequences of licensor insolvency. Contractual provisions material in cir-
cumstances of licensor bankruptcy should be clearly delineated. Such provisions
include, but are not limited to, the following: apportionment of royalties between IP
and technical support in software licenses, upfront payment of maintenance fees for
patents and registration fees for trademarks. Firstly, neither the BIA nor the CCAA
define IP, or specify whether registration is required. As such, the rights that ac-
company an IP license typically include more than just the narrow use of the IP,
such as the right to receive upgrades and maintenance and to modify and copy the
IP. It remains to be seen how expansively the licensee’s “right to use” the IP will be
interpreted by courts.
One prospectus or portfolio example is Pharma Royalty Trust, which clearly
displays both the underlying drug, i.e. Neulasta®, and its “marketer”, Amgen,
along with: the marketer’s credit rating (S&P or Moody’s); the indication (either
approved or “in development — applications, formulations); the product’s sales
rank; the product’s therapeutic ranking; annual sales; and the original seller of the
royalty (typically universities). This case study demonstrates a quantitative, quanti-
fiable, and empirically relevant measure of asset value. If this level of risk would
defeat investor confidence in public markets, regulators could disallow contingent
172 Adam M Slavens, “Beyond Legislative Reform: Intellectual Property Licenses Under
Canadian Bankruptcy Law” (2009) 22:1 Commercial Insolvency Reporter 7, online:
Torys <http://www.torys.com/Publications/Documents/Publication%20PDFs/AR2009-
52.pdf> [Legislative Reform].
173 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3.
174 Companies’ Creditors Arangement Act, RSC 1985, c. C-36.
175 Slavens, “Legislative Reform”, supra note 172.
176 Industry Canada, Summary of Key Legislative Changes in Chapter 47 of the Statutes of
Canada, 2005, and Chapter 36 of the Statutes of Canada, 2007 (8 February 2012),
online: Industry Canada <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br01782.html>.
177 Slavens, “Legislative Reform”, supra note 172.
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payment rights from being deemed issuable as securities unless registered as an
exemption.
(F) Item 19: Audit Committees and Corporate Governance
(i) Disclosure of Specialized Focus on Management Team
Existing prospectus requirements exist for disclosure of management compe-
tence to assuage investors and their confidence in capital markets; precedent exists
supplementing and enforcing this. However, while profit margins and increasing
profitability in general business is one thing, it is arguable that successful manage-
ment and accurate business judgment surrounding pharmaceutical royalty assets is
another matter altogether. The majority of patent-backed security issuers, although
few, consist of management teams with staff specializing in Medicine, Oncology,
and Business — in that order.
While existing mechanisms exist in securities regulation to provide full, true,
and plain disclosure regarding management, such regulations should be adapted in
the intangible asset context to represent the expertise for that industry. It is pro-
posed that information be provided about both management committees, as well as
the investment committees determining when and where to invest.
This could include detailed description of those committees’ collective experi-
ence in healthcare (clinical research, sales, and marketing operations) and finance
(structured finance, venture capital, investment banking and capital markets). An
established track record over the past fiscal years of identifying leading therapeu-
tics and blockbuster products within portfolios, for example, for critical care indica-
tions or treatments for serious medical conditions, would also be relevant. Such
documentation would be illustrative of the performance of management and invest-
ment committees and their ability to deliver superior value to shareholders, and
could be appropriately modeled after existing securities legislation. This informa-
tion is sufficiently quantitative, standardized, and empirically relevant to warrant
inclusion in existing disclosure requirements.
(ii) Disclosure of Experience in Intellectual Property Management
Intangible assets comprised 73 percent of collective net worth in 1999, making
intangible asset management a core competency “in every department, the execu-
tive suite, and boardroom.” Even the most thorough product development plans and
market strategies will fail to prevent loss of market share and margin erosion if a
company is not prepared. Indeed, corporate law has evolved to acknowledge this
trend as well. A growing consideration for corporate managers is the threat of man-
agement, board, and director liability through shareholder lawsuits for failing to
make “best efforts” to guide research and development away from infringement
problems, as well as to conduct an IP audit.178
As such, evidence of a management committee prepared to respond to crises
like, for example, competitors’ rolling out of a better product threatening sales and
market position, the initiation of litigation for patent infringement, or the challenge
178 Effective Management, supra note 138.
322   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [11 C.J.L.T.]
of a company’s quarterly earnings forecast by a Wall Street analyst.179 Modeled
after existing securities legislation, such information is sufficiently quantitative,
standardized, and empirically relevant, and should be made clear to potential inves-
tors in the prospectus.
(G) Non-Disclosure in Patent Law: Confidential Disclosure and
Material Change Legislation
Another valuation problem that has been identified is inherent in the negotia-
tion process itself of early-stage financing; existing prospectus-level disclosure re-
quirements are inadequate to balance the reasonable desire of lenders or investors
to know as much as possible about the underlying technologies with the reasonable
anxiety of the entrepreneur, in need of capital, to disclose what may be unpatented
technology or trade secrets to others. While it is proposed that the above valuation
model should offer a progressive alternative to assuage many investor concerns,
there are further mechanisms of securities regulation which currently exist should
supplementary information be required. This could be conducted through the use of
confidential disclosure and material change legislation, qualified by the establish-
ment that disclosure would be “unduly detrimental” to the interests of the issuer,
such that investor protection is secured as well.180
(d) Conclusion
While there have only been a few publicly reported securitizations related to
drug royalty payment rights, including the BioPharma Royalty Trust, Royalty
Pharma Trust, Paul Capital’s Royalty Securitization Trust and the DRI Capital Inc.
transactions, the pharmaceutical market generates approximately US $800 billion
annually, making the patent-backed security worthy of exploration.181 The chal-
lenges outlined above, including assessment of validity of the underlying patent,
litigation, and regulatory impact, may be mediated if presented in disclosure re-
quirements in an quantitative, standardized, and empirically relevant form. In this
article seventeen indicia have been selected which warrant inclusion in the follow-
ing categories of the prospectus: Financial Information, in the form an IP audit;
Evidence-Based Indicia of Patent Value, under Item 29: Other Material Facts; Risk
of Technological Obsolescence, in Item 21: Risk Factors; Litigation Data, in Item
23: Legal Proceedings and Regulatory Actions; Executory or Non-Executory Con-
tracts in Event of Bankruptcy, in Item 27: Material Contracts; and Disclosure of
Management Team and Intellectual Property Management, in Item 19: Audit Com-
mittees and Corporate Governance. If this can facilitate investor decision-making,
and an appropriate risk-reward profile with regard to patent-backed securities, the
securitization industry will likely cultivate a new asset class, as it has many once-
unique asset types.
179 Ibid.
180 Securities Act, supra note 1 at s. 75(3); NI 51-102, supra note 134 at s. 7.1(2).
181 Edwards, Blueprint, supra note 76.
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VI. CONCLUSION: SUPPORT FOR INCREMENTAL SECURITIES
LAW REFORM
(a) Fulfillment of the Legislative Objectives of Investor Protection and
Efficient Capital Markets
This article has addressed the question of whether an improved legal climate
for the use of IP as collateral would be useful to lenders, investors, and borrowers
over the long term as an alternative to traditional financial instruments. In Section I,
the balance struck by securities law between conservatism and innovation was
identified, along with the challenges posed by a shifting economic landscape com-
prised of intangible assets. In Section II, the life sciences sector was chosen to illus-
trate the current barriers to the flow of capital to high-value enterprise, resulting in
decreased innovation and economic growth. These included the existence of “ever
greening”, non-practicing entities, patent thickets, and onerous transaction costs on
upstream patent holders. In Section III, the tool of intangible asset finance was in-
troduced as a means of harnessing the value of IP assets, and leveraging them
through their securitization. This was proposed as a method of bridging the “valley
of death” of translational research at the bench, to clinical applications at the bed-
side. In Section IV, a case study of the instrument of patent-backed securities was
conducted with regard to the life sciences sector, exploring financial instruments
including drug royalty securitization companies and mega funds. Several benefits
to three classes were outlined: patent holders; originators, underwriters, lenders,
and insurers; and investors, traders, and speculators. The long-term impacts of im-
proved innovation on both a competitive economy, and disease mortality and pub-
lic health, were noted. In Section V, quantitative, standardized, and empirically rel-
evant indicia were presented as measures of asset value in patent-backed securities.
Twenty-two indicia were selected as incremental reform of securities law in the
form of modified disclosure requirements. It was suggested that these indicia could
supplement existing areas of the prospectus, including Financial Information; Ma-
terial Facts; Risk Factors; Legal Proceedings and Regulatory Action; Material Con-
tracts; and Audit Committees and Corporate Governance.
By making slight modifications to existing securities regulation in the limited
sphere of patent-backed securities, the Securities Act’s purposes of investor protec-
tion and market efficiency can be consistently fulfilled. Through the use of finan-
cial engineering in the context of intangible asset finance, the decoupling of patents
could have a salubrious effect on the market for high-value enterprise like the life
sciences and promote innovation. The economic, social, and public health benefits
of this innovation warrant meaningful consideration of incremental securities law
reform to facilitate this process.
As more companies leverage intangible assets and seek to maximize the un-
realized value of their asset portfolios through licensing, selling, or acquiring tech-
nology, a more mature capital market for intellectual property will develop. Intel-
lectual property promises to be the driving force behind commercial success in the
future, and economies which fail to effectively legislate this development and af-
ford opportunities for effective intellectual property management will lag behind
those economies that do. This will have drastic implications for not only the effi-
ciency of capital markets, but in stimulating technological innovation and generat-
ing access to the products of that innovation.
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Despite the challenges, the opportunities present in the securitization of intel-
lectual property are commensurate with those of the Industrial Revolution. Securi-
ties law, and its disclosure requirements, should be incrementally reformed to
achieve investor protection and market efficiency, and to realize the opportunity
presented by intangible asset finance.
Appendix A — Intangible Assets as a Proportion of S&P 500
Market Value
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Appendix B — Known Volume of IP-Backed Securitization
Transactions
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Appendix C — Patent-Backed Security Portfolio Case Study
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Appendix D — Patent-Backed Securitization Case Study
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Appendix E — Patent-Backed Securitization Framework
Case Study
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Appendix F — Report on Reserves Data, Form 51-101F2
“Note: [30 Dec 2010] — The following is a consolidation of Form 51-101F2.
It incorporates the amendments to this document that came into effect on December
28, 2007 and December 30, 2010. This consolidation is provided for your conve-
nience and should not be relied on as authoritative.”
Form 51-101F2 — Report on Reserves Data by
Independent Qualified Reserves Evaluator or Auditor
This is the form referred to in item 2 of section 2.1 of National Instrument 51-
101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities (“NI 51-101”).
1. Terms to which a meaning is ascribed in NI 51-101 have the same
meaning in this form.182
2. The report on reserves data referred to in item 2 of section 2.1 of NI
51-101, to be executed by one or more qualified reserves evaluators or
auditors independent of the reporting issuer, must in all material respects
be as follows:
Report on Reserves Data
To the board of directors of [name of reporting issuer] (the “Company”):a
1. We have [audited] [evaluated] [and reviewed] the Company’s reserves
data as at [last day of the reporting issuer’s most recently completed finan-
cial year]. The reserves data are estimates of proved reserves and probable
reserves and related future net revenue as at [last day of the reporting is-
suer’s most recently completed financial year], estimated using forecast
prices and costs.
2. The reserves data are the responsibility of the Company’s management.
Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the reserves data based on our
[audit] [evaluation] [and review].
We carried out our [audit] [evaluation] [and review] in accordance with
standards set out in the Canadian Oil and Gas Evaluation Handbook (the
“COGE Handbook”) prepared jointly by the Society of Petroleum Evalua-
tion Engineers (Calgary Chapter) and the Canadian Institute of Mining,
Metallurgy & Petroleum (Petroleum Society).
3. Those standards require that we plan and perform an [audit] [evaluation]
[and review] to obtain reasonable assurance as to whether the reserves data
are free of material misstatement. An [audit] [evaluation] [and review] also
includes assessing whether the reserves data are in accordance with princi-
ples and definitions presented in the COGE Handbook.
4. The following table sets forth the estimated future net revenue (before
deduction of income taxes) attributed to proved plus probable reserves, esti-
182 For the convenience of readers, CSA Staff Notice 51-324 Glossary to NI 51-101 Stan-
dards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities sets out the meanings of terms that are
printed in italics in sections 1 and 2 of this Form or in NI 51-101, Form 51-101F1,
Form 51-101F3 or Companion Policy 51-101CP.
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mated using forecast prices and costs and calculated using a discount rate of
10 percent, included in the reserves data of the Company [audited] [evalu-
ated] [and reviewed] by us for the year ended xxx xx, 20xx, and identifies
the respective portions thereof that we have [audited] [evaluated] [and re-






Qualified Preparation or Net Present Value of Future Net Revenue




Auditor Report Area) Audited Evaluated Reviewed Total
Evaluator xxx xx, xxxx $xxx $xxx $xxx $xxx
A 20xx
Evaluator xxx xx, xxxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
B 20xx
Totals $xxx $xxx $xxx $xxx2
5. In our opinion, the reserves data respectively [audited] [evaluated] by us
have, in all material respects, been determined and are in accordance with
the COGE Handbook, consistently applied. We express no opinion on the
reserves data that we reviewed but did not audit or evaluate.
6. We have no responsibility to update our reports referred to in paragraph 4
for events and circumstances occurring after their respective preparation
dates.
7. Because the reserves data are based on judgements regarding future
events, actual results will vary and the variations may be material.
Executed as to our report referred to above:
Evaluator A, City, Province or State / Country, Execution Date ...................................
[signed]
Evaluator B, City, Province or State / Country, Execution Date ...................................
[signed]
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Appendix G — Future Oriented Financial Information
Potential Drug Sales according to Patent Duration
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Appendix H — Global Sales Data for Anatomical
Therapeutic Classes183
Top 20 Therapeutic Classes 2012
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008
2012 Sales 2012 % Sales 2011 % Sales 2010 % Sales 2009 % Sales 2008 %
Rank (US$Bn) Growth (US$Bn) Growth (US$Bn)Growth (US$Bn)Growth (US$Bn)Growth
Global 856.1 1.8 841.2 4.8 802.5 5.6 760.1 6.8 711.9 5.2
Market
ONCO- 1 61.6 5.1 58.6 3.9 56.4 8.8 51.8 8.6 47.7 12.4
LOGICS




COMBO 3 51.6 (3.5 ) 53.4 (2.7 ) 54.9 0.7 54.5 3.8 52.5 (3.1 )
AN- 4 42.4 8.2 39.2 11.7 35.1 14.3 30.7 13.2 27.1 10.3
TIDIABET-
ICS
MENTAL 5 41.6 (13.8 ) 48.3 4.6 46.2 7.6 42.9 1.8 42.2 4.7
HEALTH
RESPIRATO-
RY AGENTS 6 39.7 1.4 39.2 7.5 36.5 8.6 33.6 10.7 30.3 6.1
AN- 7 38.8 (3.7 ) 40.3 (1.5 ) 40.9 3.4 39.5 5.4 37.5 4.0
TIBACTERI-
ALS




EASES 9 27.8 15.1 24.1 14.6 21.1 16.8 18.0 18.4 15.2 19.5






LARS 11 19.2 8.6 17.7 9.1 16.2 8.3 15.0 8.5 13.8 6.3




DISORDERS 13 18.8 4.8 18.0 5.6 17.0 (0.6 ) 17.1 (15.6 ) 20.3 9.2
OTHER CNS 14 16.7 4.5 15.9 4.8 15.2 6.6 14.3 5.4 13.5 —
183 IMS Health, Top 20 Therapeutic Classes 2012, (2013) online: IMS Health
<http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/ims/Global/Content/Corporate/Press%20Room/Top-
Line%20Market%20Data%20&%20Trends/Top_20_Therapeutic_Classes_2012.pdf>.
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Top 20 Therapeutic Classes 2012
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008
2012 Sales 2012 % Sales 2011 % Sales 2010 % Sales 2009 % Sales 2008 %
Rank (US$Bn) Growth (US$Bn) Growth (US$Bn)Growth (US$Bn)Growth (US$Bn)Growth
VITAMINS
& MINER-




OTHER) 16 13.8 3.9 13.3 13.7 11.7 8.1 10.8 (1.0 ) 10.9 (0.7 )





HIBITORS 18 12.6 (23.3 ) 16.4 4.4 15.7 3.8 15.1 9.2 13.8 10.8
HOSPITAL
SOLUTIONS 19 12.1 8.8 11.1 7.1 10.4 8.1 9.6 8.5 8.9 10.4
